THE NOTIONS mēnōg AND gētya IN
THE PAHLAVI TEXTS AND THEIR RELATION
TO ESCHATOLOGY

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The Zoroastrian religion is primarily known as dualistic in the sense that the opposition between the powers of good and the powers of evil occupies in its thought a central position. In addition to this opposition there is, however, in Zoroastrianism another pair of notions, which is no less important for a proper understanding of Zoroastrian ideas: the contrast between the notions of mēnōg, Avestan mainyava, 'that which is non-material, non-sensual, intelligible', sometimes best translated 'ideal' in the sense of a conceptual prototype of a concrete existence, on the one hand, and gētya,1 Avestan gaētya,2 'the material, earthly (world), that which can be apprehended through the senses', on the other. This pair of contrasting notions is neutral to the ethical dualism

1 The word is often spelled in the Pahlavi texts gytwx, and was read by H. S. Nyberg *gēth or gēth, to distinguish between the substantive and the adjective, read by him gēth; cf. Hilsburch des Pehlevi, II, Uppsala 1931, 80ff., and Journal Asiatique, 219 (1931), p. 31ff. There is however no evidence for a vocalization -ā- in Middle or New Persian texts. Pāzand gēth, gēthi, gēthi, NP gēthi, MPT gēthi, can all be best explained as reflecting a MP gēthi. The fact that an additional suffix -yk is usually added to the word in order to form the adjective (to be read gēthyā) shows that the basic word had no formal distinction between substantive and adjective as Nyberg suggests, in the same way as mēnōg is a substantivized adjective, with a secondary adjectival form mēnōgly. (In this I believe I am following the view of W. B. Henning.)

2 In the Avestan text the same opposition was often expressed by other words. It is found already in the Gāthās, expressed for example as follows: dāavī abtav astevalasīa hyagti managāhī, Y 28,2 (and similarly Y 43,3).
of Zoroastrianism and cuts through it. As it occupies a prominent position in the Zoroastrian religion, and particularly in the later literature, it has not been neglected by modern research, and a discussion of the terms can be found in the various general descriptions of the Zoroastrian religion.\textsuperscript{3} Even so, some of the main aspects connected with them still require a detailed exposition; a thorough historical study of these concepts is called for, as well as a systematic description of their theological position in the Pahlavi writings. The twin concepts are crucial for understanding the mythological as well as the theological texts, and as they underwent considerable change of sense and usage from the Avestan period until the ninth century, when most of the extant Pahlavi texts were committed to writing, it is necessary to show how they developed; there is no doubt that they absorbed at least some amount of outside influence.\textsuperscript{4} Leaving the historical problems aside, we shall here content ourselves with making some observations of a more general nature, with the aim of elucidating the theoretical position which this pair of opposites occupies in the


\textsuperscript{4} Cf. P. J. de Menasce in his edition of \textit{Škand-gumānīk Vičār}, Fribourg 1945, p. 102 f.; R. C. Zaechner, \textit{Dawn and twilight}, p. 200 ff. It is not quite clear to me how it is possible to arrive (as Zaechner does) at the conclusion that \textit{mēnōg}, in the sense of "the totally unformed primal matter of Aristotelian philosophy", was considered a third principle, besides the two spirits of orthodox theology. There is no evidence for this, apart from the general statement made by Eznik that some Zoroastrians accept three principles, a statement which can be better explained in other ways. It is, on the other hand, improbable that a philosophically inclined Zoroastrian, who defined \textit{mēnōg} as meaning "a single, uncompounded substance without parts, invisible and intangible" (ibid., p. 200), would at the same time regard it as a member in a triad; even more so when we consider that the two other members of this group are supposed to be the two principles of good and evil—notions of a completely different order.
structure of late orthodox Zoroastrianism, as it is seen in the Pahlavi books.

In Pahlavi the terms have two distinct usages, which in the Avestan language were kept separate by a morphological distinction between *mainyava* (adj.) and *mainyu* (m. substantival). When used as adjectives or abstract nouns, they denote, first, two modes of being as cosmological ideas, the non-material as opposed to the material. When used as substantives they denote classes of beings.

The essential difference between the two modes of being is usually expressed by the contrast between visible *gélīg* and invisible *ménōg*, but this criterion does not seem to hold in every case. Thus, for example, the clouds are said to be *ménōg* beings carrying in them *gélīg* water;\(^5\) the sky is held to be *ménōg*;\(^6\) the sun is apparently considered *ménōg*, at least in one passage.\(^7\) There are also various references to 'seeing *ménōg*', as with regard to Zoroaster,\(^8\) or when a new-born child is said to have the capa-

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\(^5\) GBd 222.9f.; *Pahlavi Rivāyat*, ed. Dhabhar, p. 163.14f.
\(^6\) GBd 221.15. I am not sure of the precise meaning of the phrase: *u-š dāhārīn (*l*) gélīg nēst*, Pahl. Rivāyat, p. 128.11, where it refers to asmān, and op. cit. p. 129.7f., where it refers to *sumay*.
\(^7\) DkM 42.20f.; cf. Appendix B, note 12 (below, p. 97).
\(^8\) DkM 645.16. In a Middle Persian passage which is found in the *Pādensd Texts* (ed. E. K. Antā, Bombay 1909, p. 62ff.) immediately after the Bundahīsh, and which follows in the Munich manuscript Mō the book *Šāyast ne šāyast* (cf. *Pahlavi Texts*, translated by E. W. West, Part I, Sacred Books of the East, vol. V, p. 372ff.), Zoroaster addresses Ohrmazd saying: 'Thy head, hands, feet, hair, face, and tongue are in my eyes just like those even which are my own, and you have the clothing men have; give me a hand, so that I may grasp thy hand' (West's translation). Ohrmazd's answer is: *man mainyā agarfān hām dastī man garfāstan na šah* "I am an intangible spirit. It is not possible to grasp my hand", Zoroaster is worried by the fact that Ohrmazd and the Amahravandis are intangible: when he departs from the presence of Ohrmazd and will no longer see him, there will be no way of experiencing the divinity by the senses. Ohrmazd's answer to this is that the specific material creations of Ohrmazd and of each of the Amahravandis (righteous man, cattle, fire, metal, earth and virtuous woman, water and vegetation) represent their concrete presence in the world, even when they themselves are invisible. Another text shows Zoroaster's capacity to see *ménōg* with regard to the *druj*; he is said to have been the only one who saw the onslaught of the demon (although the text can be construed differently): *ka druj ā dām dwārist be zarōstīt az gélīgān kās-ez ne dād* (*Pahlavi Rivāyat*, p. 130.6f).
city to see mēnōg. Ohrmazd is said to see the spirit of men, ‘for Ohrmazd sees everything’.  

There is, however, no justification, as far as I can see, for saying, as H. S. Nyberg does, that mēnōg was conceived to be corporeal, and to have a body and a form. When a mēnōg being makes an apparition in front of a human being it is said to put on a bodily form, and this form, one can generally deduce from the context, does not belong to it organically. A characteristic example is found in the story of Wahman who came towards Zoroaster in the form of a man:

\[ka\ az\ hān\ ul\ rahl\ zardušt,\ ā-š\ mard\ did\ ka\ rahl\ az\ ūrapīd\win-lar\ nēmag.\ hān\ būd\ wahan,\ ud\ hān\ awe\ sah\ist\ wahan\ pēš-karb,\ ku\ pad-tan-cāsm-lar\ bawēd,\ ud\ pēz-nēwag,\ ku\ pad\ harw\ ciš\ pēz\ būd,\ hān\ awe\ sah\ist\ wahan\ cand\ hān\ ī\ 3-mard-nēzag\ bālāy\ . . . (DkM 624.8–12; facsimile edition, p. [496]).\]

“When Zoroaster went up from there, he saw a man who was going from the southern direction. That was Wahman. Wahman seemed to him as one who has the form in front, so that he might be more visible to bodily eye, and as one who has goodness in front, namely, he was to the fore in everything. Wahman seemed to him to have the height of three spears of a man . . .”

The text seems, by its syntax and by the fact that it contains epithets which require a somewhat strained interpretation in Pahlavi, to be a translation from an Avestan original.

The same type of conception is seen with regard to the mythical figure of Varāhaṇa, who assumes a number of forms according to Yašt 14, and also with regard to the various incarnations of

10 Dādestān I Dēng XXX, 6 (this text is quoted according to the divisions in the edition of Annesaria).
12 Cf. G. Widengren, The Great Vohu Manah and the Apostle of God, Uppsala 1945, p. 60. (In transcriptions from Pahlavi I have not generally noted W or Y added to or omitted from the text.)
Xwarr, the concept of fortune. Similarly, Ohrmazd is said to have put omniscient wisdom in Zoroaster’s hand “in the form of water”, which Zoroaster was made to drink. Dēn, Avestan daēnā, is another instance for this phenomenon. It appears in the form of a maiden in eschatological scenes and has to declare its identity to the man whose religious ego it represents: it is apparently not supposed to be recognized by its mere form.

Notwithstanding these observations, the contrast between mēnōg and gēltīg is regularly defined by the adjectives ‘invisible’ as against ‘visible’ in the Pahlavi writings.

\[
\text{winmand I gēltīg wēnīšnīg gūrišnōmand ciš. harw ce pad pad lan} \\
\text{cašm wēnīšnīg ud pad lan dast gūrišnōmand gēltīg (DkM 120.20–} \\
\text{22; reading corrected from facsimile edition, p. [90].13–15) } \\
\text{[cf. de Menasce, Pratīdānam (Festschr. Kuiper), p. 194.]} \\
\]

“The definition of gēltīg is: a visible, tangible thing. Whatever is visible with bodily eye and tangible with bodily hand is gēltīg.”

Or similarly in another text:

a-wēnīšnīg mēnōg a-gumēzišn ē wēnāfdāg stī ud wēnīšnīg 

nīmūnag, mēnōg-waxšag ruwān andar gēltīg-ravišnīg lan 

nēwag xwadāy kard (Dādestān i Denig II, 13).

“He made the unseen and unmixed mēnōg over to visible existence, a model perceptible by sight. He made the soul, existing in mēnōg, the good lord in the body, flourishing in gēltīg”.

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17 Cf. for this passage especially the remarks made by P. J. de Menasce in his edition of Škand-yumānīk Vičār, p. 102 ff., where further passages are discussed. Dēnkard III, chapter 123 (DkM 119 ff.), also defines gēltīg in these terms.
19 The expression mēnōg-waxšag as opposed to gēltīg-ravišnīg, is discussed in Appendix A, below p. 87 ff.
20 The translations of this passage by M. Molé, in his book *Culte, mythe et cos-
These two modes are also conceived of as being two realms or domains, differentiated as it were geographically, as in the phrase which occurs in the famous catechism of the Paud-Nāmag:


'Have I come from mēnōg or have I been originated in gēlīg?'
(The proper Zoroastrian answer to this question is, of course, the first alternative).

In this text, however, the underlying meaning of the two terms cannot be made clear only by reference to a cosmological difference between two zones or spheres of existence. There is also a certain value symbolism attached to the two concepts: the first, mēnōg, stands for the religious values, and the second represents the secular world. This difference is connected with the idea that mēnōg is also a term for the eschatological world and for what it stands for: the trial of the spirits, reward and punishment. A person can be said to attach himself to mēnōg as opposed to gēlīg in the sense that he leads a life dedicated to virtue, constantly meditating about the final judgement.\(^{21}\)

Apart from this abstract usage of the two terms, they can also denote two classes of individual beings belonging respectively to the two modes of existence. To this category of usage belong phrases like mēnōgān ud gēlīgān, 'mēnōg and gēlīg beings';

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\(^{21}\) A typical text illustrating this point is: xīr i gēlīg a-paymān ne ārāyīēn, ce gēlīg a-paymān-ārāg mard mēnōg-wiẖb bawēd (Dēnkard VI, 149; = Dkm 505). "One ought not to embellish the things of gēlīg in excess of the measure, for a man who embellishes gēlīg in excess of the measure becomes one who corrupts mēnōg".
mēnōgān yazdān, ‘the mēnōg ones, the gods’; or the expression mēnōg when applied to the two antagonistic spirits, Ohrmazd and Ahraman.  

So much for the definition of the two terms. When they are examined as used in the context of creation, we notice that the Greater Bundahišn describes the process by which the world came into being as consisting of three stages. The relevant passage runs as follows:

ōhrmazd pad amahraspandān brīnōmand mad ka-š dād būd hēnd 3 rad. ce-š abāz ō gēlig abāyast dādan, u-š nō-g-tar pad tan ū pasēn anāgīh az-ēš be a-paydāg hurdan. u-š dām ī mēnōg mēnōgīhā dārēd, u-š dām ī gēlig mēnōgīhā dād, u-š did be ū gēligīhā dād (GBd 13.7–13). “Ohrmazd came to be a possessor of time divisions, three periods, through the amahraspands, when he created them. For he had to create them back into gēlig, and then again to extinguish evil from them in the future body. He holds mēnōg creation in mēnōg form, he created gēlig creation in mēnōg form, and he created it again into gēlig form”.

We seem to have here two alternative interpretations of an earlier, presumably Avestan, tradition concerning the three periods connected with the creation of the Amahraspands. The first version is incomplete: a reference to the first creation, in mēnōg, is missing. This omission can be explained either as the result of a scribal error, or preferably as an ellipse, made by the author, of an obvious idea which the reader is certain to complete for himself. The three stages should be, according to the first

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23 Examples for this can be seen in H. S. Nyberg, Hilfsbuch des Pehlevi, II, p. 150.

23 The main Pahlavi texts which deal with the double creation, mēnōg and gēlig, have been discussed more than once, but they still await definitive publication. They are most conveniently given in transcription and translation in R. C. Zehmer, Zurvan: a Zoroastrian dilemma, Oxford 1955, p. 276ff., where references to earlier literature will be found. Of subsequent publications, some of the remarks on textual matters in M. Molé’s article entitled “Le problème zorvanite”, Journal Asiatique, 247 (1959), p. 431–469, are particularly important. Interesting observations are also made by U. Bianchi, Zoroaštra i Ōhrmazd, Torino 1958, p. 95ff.

24 Cf. M. Molé, loc. cit., p. 438f., where a somewhat different translation is given.

5 Acta Orientalia, XXXIII
version: (creation in mēnōg), creation in gēlig, the eschatological period.

The alternative interpretation tries to distinguish between three moments in creation by itself, without taking eschatology into account. The three stages thus obtained are: (1) mēnōg creation in mēnōg; then gēlig creation (2) first in mēnōg, (3) then in gēlig. The first, or pure mēnōg creation, may not involve a creation strictly speaking at all, for the verb used is dārēd "holds". The first moment here indicates a state of existence before any material creation of the world is envisaged; this is followed by a first stage of 'real' creation: the prototype of the material world being fashioned in "ideal" form, which is then translated into gēlig. The two interpretations have in common the fact that one of the "three periods" falls outside the proper existence of this world: in the first it is eschatology, in the second it is the periods preceding the proper existence of the universe. Both interpretations of this tradition depend upon the statement that the three periods came into being with the creation of the Amahraspands, which statement belonged, so it seems, to the original Avestan sacred text on which the Pahlavi elaboration is based.

The text of the first chapter of the Bundahišn is in fact based on a conception of creation in three stages, on the lines of this second interpretation. It also presents the creation of the world as a process in which the Amahraspands take part. The essential trait of the Bundahišn's description is that the world was first formed in a mēnōg form, and that this conceptual or mēnōg world was later translated into a visible and tangible form, into gēlig. This mythology of creation seems to interpret in temporal terms a duality of existence which is taken to characterize life in the world. The mēnōg world is taken here to precede gēlig. Gēlig does not exist on its own. It is foreshadowed by a mēnōg prototype, from which it is derived and on which it continues to be in a sense dependent.

The same type of relationship between mēnōg and gēlig in the context of creation is formulated in theological terms in a

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25 This point is made by M. Molé in his analysis of the chapter, loc. cit., p. 442–445.

number of texts in the third book of the *Dēnkard*. To quote a fairly short but representative chapter:27

> abar dām mēnōgīg āfurdan, az mēnōgīh ō gēlīghīh rasīdan paydāghīh, az nīgēz ī weh-dēn.

1. āhd mēnōg āfuriśn bawiśn ast ī a-hambūd wāspuhragānih ast ī a-wēniśnīg a-giriśnīg, ud bun ast ī gēlīg.

2. ud gēlīg dahiśn ham-bawiśnīg ī bawiśn ī mēnōg, ud dahiś ud paydāghīh ast ī mēnōg, u-ś wāspuhragānih ast ī wēniśnīg giriśnōmand.

3. ud ēd paydāg ku mēnōg bun ī gēlīg. ēn-ez paydāghīh ka gēlīg ciś az ham-bawiśnīh ciś wīśgīhēd abāz ā bawiśn mēnōg rasēd ī-ś ast bun.

4. ud mēnōg bawiśn ēwag ast ī a-bihr, ōh-ez mēnōg, dādār fradom aześīg āfuriśn ī zwāniēhēd bawiśn.

5. ud gēlīg ham-bawiśnīh dahiśn *ast *ī dādār az fradom aześīg āfuriśn bawiśn ham-bawiśnīd.

6. ud dām fradom pad mēnōg dād, az mēnōghīg gēlīghīh āwurd. weh-dēn nīgēz ēn-ez paydāghīh.

"On creating the creatures in mēnōg, their manifestation coming from mēnōg to gēlīg. From the instruction of the Good Religion.

(1) Mēnōg creation is 'becoming' (bawiśn), without adversary. It has a special quality:28 invisible and intangible. It is the root of gēlīg.29

(2) Gēlīg production30 is a 'co-existent' (ham-bawiśnīg)31 of


28 The latest discussion of the word wāspuhragan 'special, particular' is by W. B. Henning in *Indo-Iranica, Mélanges Morgenstierne*, Wiesbaden 1964, p. 95–97. Numerous occurrences are recorded, especially in *Dēnkard* and *Śkand-gumānīk Vičār* (VII, 2, the abstracts paśtāl ciharaunādā wāspuhragāni, 'being fashioned, being given nature and having special qualities', stand in juxtaposition; and similarly further in the same chapter).

29 This simile occurs more than once. Thus in *Śkand-gumānīk Vičār* VIII, 24: gōdī bar ā mahōgō vaś mahōgō bun, 'Gēlīg is the fruit of mēnōg, mēnōg is its root'.

30 There is a consistent terminological distinction between āfurdan (āfurdan), which is the verb reserved for mēnōg creation, and dādān, dahiśn, a verb which
mēnōg 'becoming'. It is a product\(^22\) and a manifestation of mēnōg. It has a special quality: being visible and tangible.

(3) This is revealed: mēnōg is the root of gēlīg. This is also a revelation: when a gēlīg thing is loosened from 'co-existence', it comes back to 'becoming', mēnōg, which is its root.

(4) Mēnōg, viz. 'becoming', is one, undivided. Even this is mēnōg, the first originated\(^33\) creation of the Creator, called 'becoming'.

is used when the secondary character of gēlīg production is to be emphasized. The etymology of āfrīdan favors a spiritual connotation; cf. W. B. Henning, ‘Das Verbem des Mittelpersischen der Turfanfragmente’, Zeitschrift für Indologie und Iranistik, IX, 1933, p. 200f. This verb was exclusively used in the Manichaean texts for expressing the idea of creation, conveyed in Syriac by the verb qerā, 'to call'; see P. C. Andreas and W. B. Henning, Mittelirnatische Manichaica aus Chinesisch-Turkesthan, I, Berlin 1932 (Sitzungsberichte der preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, phil.-hist. Klasse, 1932), p. 179 n. 5. H. Junker (Vorl. des der Bibliothek Warburg, 1921–22, p. 134) reads this word āwārīn, but this is unfounded. The verb dādān was perhaps chosen for gēlīg creation because it could convey the notion of a transference or 'giving over' of what has previously existed in mēnōg. In the last sentence of our text the verb āmurūd in which the idea of motion is even more stressed, is substituted. In that phrase it comes in opposition to dād, which designates there mēnōg creation (dād being also used as the general word for creation). [Cf. Gnoli, op. cit., p. 174 and n. 37.]

\(^{21}\) The precise meaning of hambāwīn can be deduced from hambōd 'that which exists together, a rival'. In DkM 99.5f. we read: ud rōn mēnōg . . . az a-ham-bōd mēnōg bawīn d hamb-bawīn t hān gēlīg waštān šāyēd "the luminary mēnōg . . . can turn from mēnōg 'being' lacking a rival into the 'co-existence' of that gēlīg". The word is used with a different emphasis in the following passage: dādār ēwag ēwag stī az būn t stī mēnōg ud wamx az būn t wamx zōr abāz xuṣt, ud ēwānāgōmand ud kar-bōmand pad abīnād ō-t rwān hamb-bawēnēd, abīg-ač rwān anūṣayēnēd (DkM 315.15f.). "The Creator has sought back each stī from the root of the force of stī and each spirit (wamx) from the root of the force of the spirit, and he joins them in purity, equipped with ēwānāg and karb, to the soul, and he makes them immortal, together with the soul". The precise sense in which this verb and its derivatives are used to designate a stage in the development of the embryo escapes me. It may denote the stage of the embryo's 'differentiation' or 'materialization'. Cf. Gbd p. 10, and Zaelner, Zarvan, p. 305, note to line 173.

\(^{22}\) dahīg 'product' is frequent in the Dēnkard. Cf., e.g., DkM 202.22; 203.2, 5, 6, 8; 208.4, 7; 350.8; 384.5; 417.18; 420.20; 421.5.

\(^{33}\) azēlīg 'originated, derived': the existence of this adjective shows that the postposition az-es is not considered merely as a preposition with an enclitic pronoun but constitutes a separate lexeme. On the use of the postposition cf. M. Boyce,
(5) Gēlīg is a production brought into 'co-existence', which the Creator caused to come into co-existence from the first originated creation, 'becoming'.

(6) He produced the creatures first in mēnōg; from mēnōg-ness he brought out gēlīg-ness.

This too is a revelation from the instruction of the Good Religion."

The chapter seems to present here the twofold scheme familiar to us now from the Bundahišn. There is the basic opposition between mēnōg-creation and gēlīg-creation, which are designated by the traditional technical terms bawišn and ham-bawišn, 'becoming' and 'co-existence'. The first term in this twofold scheme, bawišn, occupies also the first stage in a fourfold conception of creation, which consists of bawišn, bawišn-rawišnah, bawišn-astišnah, sī.31 The underlying idea in our chapter is however very close to the one which distinguishes three stages of creation, just like the Bundahišn text discussed above.

It does not seem as if this type of text dealing with cosmogony attaches any greater moral value to one of the two concepts, mēnōg or gēlīg. The only warranted statement which can be made on the basis of these texts is that mēnōg is primary and gēlīg is secondary, not only in the chronological sense, but also in the logical order of things. Thus, mēnōg is a datum, a pre-existent fact; it is the root. Gēlīg, being created, is in need of explanation or justification, and this is done by stating the functions for which it was created.35 Even texts of a more mythological character, in which, for example, the fire or the frawahr express their

31 This scheme is briefly discussed in Appendix B.

35 Thus, for instance, in Dēnkard III, chapter 365 (DkM 350.5-7): "From the 'wheel' (proceeded) the hot-moist 'becoming' possessed of wind; for arresting the demons which reside in mēnōg, it is, with assembled forces, the begetter of gēlīg creations, the seed of seeds" (cf. Appendix D). Zachner's translation of this passage, Zuivan, p. 374, is quite different. The reason given here for engendering gēlīg creations is the need to check the progress of evil and ultimately to vanquish it; cf. also below, notes 40 and 41.
refusal to be created into the material world and have to be coaxed into willingness,\textsuperscript{38} cannot be adduced as a proof of the inferior position of ḡēlīg. Life in the material world is full of hardship because of the interference of the evil power, but it is not said to be bad by itself. In fact, as we shall see, evil has no 'real' existence in the material world.

A discussion of the position and constitution of ḡēlīg occurs in Dānkard III, chapter 123, which begins with the following definition:\textsuperscript{37}

"ḡēlīg is a (mode of) being (ṣṭī)\textsuperscript{38} which is visible and tangible in corporeality. Its creation was for that which wages battle against [the oppression and] the oppressor, which itself is repelling the opponent of creation.\textsuperscript{39} It is connected to the eternal good motion (jāyēdānīg nēmag-raviānīh).

Its work is that for which it was created. This, too, is revealed of it: when there are no ḡēlīg creations, the work of repelling the oppressor is not accomplished (lit. the work is bare of repelling the oppressor).\textsuperscript{40}

According to this text (and this is a commonplace idea in the Pahlavi literature),\textsuperscript{41} the object of the material creation is to

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\textsuperscript{38} For the fire, cf. Pahlavi Rituval, p. 58ff., and Dkm 796.17ff.; on the frawahrs, GBd 38.14 ff.

\textsuperscript{37} Dkm 120.15–20, facsimile edition, p. [90]. The text of the chapter is transcribed completely in H. W. Bailey, Zoroastrian problems, p. 205–209, but the reading can now be revised in some points. I had the privilege to read this chapter, as well as other texts, with the Rev. Father J. de Menasce in the winter of 1963, and wish warmly to acknowledge the benefit I derived from him. [Cf. now translation of ch. 123 by de Menasce in Pralidānum (Festschrift Kuiper), The Hague-Paris 1968, pp. 193–200.]

\textsuperscript{39} See P. J. de Menasce, ŚGV, p. 102. Bailey's reading, ḡēlīk hāst ḡēlīk, is not intelligible. The difficulty in reading is caused by the word ṣṭī, which resembles ḡēlīg. The scribes do however distinguish between them by writing ṣṭī for ṣṭī and sīx (ṣīx?) for ḡēlīg. See Appendix B.

\textsuperscript{40} Reading: u-š dahišn ʾō kōxšniŋ ʾō ʾostāb ud ʾostābāy ʾī xwad ʾost dahišn-hāmēstār-spāzīh. The words ʾostāb ud ʾostābāy appear to be a dittography; the original scribe may have meant to cross out ʾostāb when he supposedly replaced it by ʾostābāy.

\textsuperscript{41} ka nēst hē ḡēlīg-dahišnēn kār brahnav az ʾostāb-spāzīh.

\textsuperscript{41} The idea is expressed also in a Pahlavi text which summarizes a lost Avestan original, the Dām-dāt Nask. It says: abar kunisn ṣī ḡādārīh ud ḡādan ʾī dām pahlom.
serve as the battle-ground for the fight against evil. It is in fact
the only plane on which the struggle can at all be favorably de-
cided. It is for this reason that it is crucially important to have a
continuous existence of the material world, and for this reason
it is also promised that there never will be a period in which
man will not exist in the material world,\textsuperscript{42} man being the main
carrier of the battle against the evil spirits.\textsuperscript{43} We thus see here a
certain dialectic relationship obtaining between \textit{mēnōg} and \textit{gēlīg}.
\textit{Mēnōg} is the primary existence, but as it is invisible and im-
movable, it lacks an aspect of reality. The real clash between the
good \textit{mēnōg} and the evil \textit{mēnōg} can only occur on a \textit{gēlīg} level.
At the same time, however, the fight which takes place between
the two parties is not conceived to be a straightforward war between
equal rivals. Only Ohrmazd and his creations 'really' exist in
\textit{gēlīg}, while Ahreman and the demons have no \textit{gēlīg} at all,\textsuperscript{44} and
they only participate in the life of \textit{gēlīg} in a secondary way,
parasitically as it were:

dām i ōhrmazd mēnōg ud gēlīg-ez. aue i druz nēst gēlīg, be
wad i mēnōgīth ahyozēd ō gēlīg. ceǫn sam i hāwandīh-ez drāz
andar āwag, a'ōn abarkīzhīh paydāg ī mēnōgān ud gēlīgān ī
weh abar mēnōgān ī wad (Dd XXXVI, 51; cf. M. Molé,

\textsuperscript{42} Cf. Dādestān i Dēnīg, parsītān XXXIV, 2 (ed. T. D. Anklasaria, p. 71):
ear gēlīg homēšag az āfarīn tā-z ő abēng fraškardārīh hagre ekē-mardom ne bād
ne-z hawīd. "This gēlīg (world), from its creation to the pure rehabilitation, never
was and never will be without man". The whole chapter is transcribed and trans-

\textsuperscript{43} Cf. the texts collected by Molé in \textit{Culte, mythe et cosmologie}, p. 469ff.

\textsuperscript{44} The theme is discussed in some detail in \textit{Studies in Mysticism and Religion}
"The creation of Ohrmazd is both mēnōg and gēlīğ, while that of the demon has no gēlīğ: but the evil of mēnōg is joined to gēlīğ. Just as there is long fear of (their) having equal power in one (of the contenders), so the victory of the good mēnōg and gēlīğ beings over the evil mēnōg ones is manifest!"

If the function of gēlīğ is to serve as the decisive battle ground between the two powers, it is clear that it was created for this purpose because it affords undeniable superiority to Ohrmazd. Gēlīğ is the place where the existence of Ahreman can be ontologically denied, and where the outcome of the battle can be foreseen with confidence, despite the fear which the apparent equality of powers arouses.

Gēlīğ is thus the stage where the proper activity of the world takes place, mēnōg in a sense becoming, after the stage of creation, a derivative mode of being: it is affected by the events of gēlīğ and seems merely to echo the happenings which go on in gēlīğ.\(^{45}\)

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\(^{45}\) This idea is expressed in Žātspram, chapters XXXIII.: ceōn nīmād pad handošag ud andor nīligān 1 *šamhādigān (?) ku ave ke-k7 andor gēlīğ kunššā-ē agāb tuwa-n.*nērōgīh ē agāb mehīh ē agāb xweškārīh ē pad-ēk savāgīg, u-ē bandīhēd pad rāshiš ē ud dārēd pad sīdād ud sazēnīsī, hān ēwēnag dānišīn ud tuwa-n-nērōgīh ud mehīh ud xweškārīh ē hān 1 ave tuwa-n pāywāndēnd, u-ē pad-ēk mēnōg ham-brōmāgīh pad-ēk bāwēd. "As was shown by analogy and in the composite (?) writings, a person who is worthy in the gēlīğ of action, craftsmanship, dignity or a vocation, and by whom it is performed (lit. tied) in truth, and who possesses it for (causing) benefit, and who makes it seemly, the same kind of knowledge, craftsmanship, dignity and vocation will be joined to his soul, and even in mēnōg the same manner will be in him". The implication is that one's worth in fulfilling one's vocation in gēlīğ is reflected in one's mēnōg position. The observations made by R. C. Zaechner (Zurvan, p. 250) are not borne out by the text, even if his reading were accepted. (Incidentally, the membership of the four classes being assigned to the category of kunšš, mentioned by Zaechner in this connection, does not presumably mean the fact of belonging to the class, which would be absurd, for this is decided by birth; it means rather fulfilling the functions of one's class properly.) The next chapter in Žātspram ends in a statement which phrases this idea sharply: a'ôn ceōn pad gēlīğ ab-lāstādār bāb, hān 1 mēnōgīg wārān kardār (p. 134): "Just as if one was in gēlīğ a pourer of water, and in mēnōg a maker of rain". The texts are discussed also by Molé, Culc, mythe et cosmologie, p. 107, who shows the continuity of orthodox tradition on these points.
This aspect of the relationship between mēnōy and gēlīg is particularly prominent in the eschatological descriptions. The original primacy of mēnōy is however not in doubt. All good in this, the gēlīg world, derives from mēnōy, and all evil likewise. Good and evil in this world are not only derivative, and therefore lacking, as it were, original force, they are also subject to the special condition of this gēlīg world, which is that of being in a state of ‘mixture’, gumēzaghīh. For this reason neither good nor evil can be experienced in this world in their full force, in purity. They are here inextricably welded together. They are blended in such a way that they can only be conceived separate in mēnōy or in eschatology: the eschatological moment in this contrast is naturally brought into play for answering questions of theodicy.

How good and evil are conceived to be mixed in gēlīg can be seen from a passage which describes the evil experienced by the wicked in hell:

\[ u-\text{s} \text{ nēst andar hēc āsānīh ud xwašīh ud urwahmīh, u-\text{s} andar ast hamāq gandaqūīh ud rīmanīh ud anāgīh ud dušzwārīh, u-\text{s} ne hangōšīdag hēc gandaqūīh ud rīmanīh ud dard ud anāgīh ī gēlīgīgh, ce ne hangōšīdag gumēzagh anāgīh ī gēlīgīgh ē hān ī-\text{s} a-jumāq nēwaghīh, u-\text{s} dūshn āz bun-kadag ī anāgīh (Dd XXVI, 3-5; p. 54). ‘There is no comfort or pleasure or joy in it. There is in it all stench and pollution and pain and evil and discomfort. No stench and pollution and pain and evil of gēlīg is similar to it, because the mixed evil of gēlīg is not similar to that with which there is no goodness, and which issues (?) from the source of evil’.\]

The text of this chapter, which denies the similarity between the evil of hell, which is mēnōy and pure, and that found in the

\[ \text{48} \text{ This is clearly stated, for example, in chapter VIII of Škand-gumānīk Vičār.} \]

\[ \text{47} \text{ This is the theme of Dārestān ī Dēnōy, pursūn V, which tries to answer the question: ‘Why does evil always come more to the good than to the wicked’. One of the ways to answer this question is to accept the existence of a balance of reward between mēnōy and gēlīg; according to this view one person cannot get reward or punishment twice, on both planes. The idea is also present in the famous ‘joyful thoughts’ of Ādurbād (DkM 572f., and parallels).} \]

\[ \text{48} \text{ On the word dūshn see Appendix C.} \]
gēlīg world, has a parallel in the preceding chapter of Dādestān ʿī Dēnīg, where a similar idea is expressed with regard to the goodness of paradise in relationship to this world.

In a non-theological context the same thought occurs in a story which can here be paraphrased: Weh-dād ʿī Ādur-Ohrmazdān, who was a chief mōbad, saw in a place by which he happened to pass two priests (ērbad) who carried fire-wood from a mountain on their backs, chanting together the Avesta and the Zand. He questioned them as to the reason for their action, and they answered: As every person must undergo the evil created by Ahreman either in gēlīg or in mēnōg, it seems to us better to go through our share of evil in gēlīg, where we see, at the same time as we suffer evil, the sun and the moon, where we get food and possessions and remedy for maladies, rather than undergo it in mēnōg, in hell, where nothing good is intermixed with the evil.

The relationship between mēnōg and gēlīg is also expressed in spatial and temporal terms. Mēnōg is unlimited, gēlīg is limited; mēnōg is intransient, gēlīg is transient:

be pad āghāh-dārīh ʿī ō gēlīgān nimūnag guftan ud nimūdan ʿī az gēlīg ēnyā kanāragōmand abāg a-kanārag, ud a-sazišnīg abāg sazišnīg, ud kahišnīg abāg a-kahišnīg ham-hangōšīdag ne bawēd. ud gēlīg ost kanāragōmand ud sazišnīg ud kahišnīg, hān ʿī a-sar-rōšnīh ast a-sazišnīg ud a-kahišnīg (Dādestān ʿī Dēnīg XXX, 18f.). “Except for the purpose of making known to the people of gēlīg, telling them and showing them an example taken from gēlīg, there is no likeness between that which is limited and that which is unlimited, that which is constant and that which is transient, that which diminishes and that which is undiminishing. Gēlīg is limited, transient,

49 Chapter XXV, discussed in Appendix C.
50 DRM 571f.; Dk VI, D5. An edition with a translation of Dēnkard, Book Six, is in press.
51 The same idea about the joy of paradise is also found in Dd XXX, 17. On a cruder level of reasoning, the fact that xīr ʿī gēlīg, ‘the things of this, the material, world’, are less perfect than xīr ʿī mēnōg, is explained (in Mēnōg ʿī Xrad, Chapter 12) as due to the influence of the planets on gēlīg.
diminishing, and the endless light is intransient and undiminishing”.

One should perhaps add that these epithets are applied to the contrast between gêlig in the meaning of the actual, transient, life in this world, as against mênôg, the world of eschatology. In GBd, p. 9, the term mênôg a-be-wardišnîh, “the non-reversibility of mênôg”, occurs, as one of the phases in the process through which creation came into being.\(^{51}\)

The distinction between the two concepts of mênôg and gêlig, it may be not superfluous to point out, is not equivalent to any contrast between divine and human beings or between creating powers and the created world. Such a contrast seems alien to Zoroastrianism.\(^{52}\) The world was first created in mênôg, and thus an aspect of creation falls under mênôg. In gêlig, on the other hand, there are also divine beings. Thus the usual formula for gods refers to ‘gods (yazdân), both mênôg ones and gêlig ones’.\(^{53}\)

The two worlds, the ideal world of mênôg and the material world of gêlig, are thus separate from each other only on the plane of creation and eschatology. In the actual world the separation can only be done by intellectual analysis. Although this is never explicitly said, the actual world could perhaps be described as one of mixture in this sense too, that mênôg and gêlig are blended in it together.\(^{54}\) This mixture is indeed stated


\(^{52}\) H.S. Nyberg, Journal Asiatique, 219 (1931), p. 34, seems to be wrong when he applies to mênôg the label ‘divine’.

\(^{53}\) Cf., e.g., Škand-yamânit Vicār I, 4; Pahl. Rivâgol, p. 72,14: yazdân i mênôgan ud yazdân i gêligân. The formula is already Avestan; cf. xinānāine yaratanam ajoang maingawanan gōdōyanqm in Yasna 7, 4; Altiranisches Wörterbuch, column 1270.

\(^{54}\) Cf. DEI 140,11 f.; facsimile edition, p. [106]: andar gamēzagh gêlig ud mênôg bahrān winārtin ud kârgi th pod ham-yazdih ud pânavasteg-zârīh i ewag abôg did bâd (- -) u-sân az wēkānān i zîr ewag az did wēkâbšt in ud a-kârīth paydâg. “In the “mixture” the arrangement and the effectiveness of the parts of gêlig and mênôg are (attained) by their being joined together and having their powers united with each other. . . . From the separation of their forces from each other there is manifest disintegration and loss of effectiveness”. The term “mixture” here, as elsewhere, refers to the state of the present world, where good and evil are mixed together; the subject-matter of the chapter, however, is the need to enable the
to be an essential condition for its proper functioning. The parables adduced for the way in which mēnōg is invisibly present in the gēlig world are those of the raw material from which a material object is made, such as the wool from which the woolen garment is fashioned or the parent’s seed in the offspring.\(^{55}\)

Every material object, as well as every intellectual concept, seems to be represented by a mēnōg prototype or to have a mēnōg counterpart.\(^{56}\) At the same time, on the other hand, mēnōg ideas have their visible incarnations, as we have seen above.

Various material bodies are said to have a mēnōg which dwells in them. It is difficult as a rule to decide whether a mēnōg which is associated with a particular object is a 'prototype', which exists separately, or a cosmic mēnōg which is inherent in that individual. Sharp differentiation is never made in the texts between the different categories of mēnōg, and the distinction may be taken to be irrelevant to the Zoroastrian authors. Separate but inherent mēnōgs can however sometimes be clearly noticed in the texts. As an example, the following passage may be quoted. To the question whether Ohrmazd can be seen by the spirits after death a negative answer is given, and the reason is this:

be ḷān ʾi ka pad uuxurg-andēšīh ʾi dādār mēnōgūn gēligūg-
wēnišnīhā paymōzēnd ayyāb ʾā gēligūn mēnōg-sōhišnīg wēnišn
abyōzēnd ēnya, axw pad gēlig-sōhišn mēnōgūn didān pad ḷān
hangōšīdag lauvān ceʾūn ka lanthā wēnēnd ke-š ruwān andār,

mēnōg and the gēlig components of this world to work in harmony and assist each other. That both elements are given equal standing is evident from the discussion which follows in the chapter, where various gēlig and mēnōg concepts which are dependent upon each other are listed, and a table is drawn to make the point clear.

\(^{55}\) The text which presents the theory around the presence of mēnōg within gēlig in the clearest manner is chapter 191 of Dēnkard III (DkM 202f.); facsimile edition, p. [157f.]); it is given in Appendix D. The idea occurs also in chapter 191 (DkM 207f.; facsimile edition p. [161f.]), and in chapter 276 (DkM 280; facsimile edition, p. [224f.]).

\(^{56}\) Examples are: ‘the spirit of the body' of man, Dādestān ʾi dēnīg XV, 7: mēnōg ʾī tan ud abārīg uch mēnōgūn (also ibid. XVI, 4, 13). ‘The spirit of creation' (mēnōg ʾī dahišn) and ‘the spirit of the worship of the religion of the Mazdeans' (mēnōg ʾī yurtīn ʾī dēn ʾi mazdešnūn) are mentioned in Dd XXI, 1. ‘The spirit of the Gāthās', DkM 709,14; ‘the spirit of the wind', Zātspram III, 10, 11; ‘the spirit of the sky', GBd 18,13.
ayāb ka ālāxš mēnōg ke-ḵ warhrān andar, ayāb āb wēnēnd ke-ḵ xwēš mēnōg andar ast (Dādestān ī Dēnīg XXX, 5).  

"Except in cases when through the great consideration of the Creator, the spirits are clothed in visible gēlığ, or when gēlığ people are endowed with sight which is in the nature of mēnōg perception, the self (of men) can see the spirits with gēlığ perception by that similitude, like when bodies are seen in which there is soul, or fire in which there is Warhrām, or water in which its spirit is found".

Every group of objects seems to have its collective mēnōg representation. Such are, for example, the Amahraspands, who represent the 'elements' of this world, each of which is a species of beings. The Amahraspands are described in one place as the mēnōg and the xwadīh, 'selfness', of gēlığ beings:

ud abārīq-ez gēlığ dahišnān pad hān i-šān mēnōg amahraspand ke-šān ast xwadīh a-marg, ud pad dēsag sāwišnōmand hēnd, pad ham-dar dādestān hān i mardom (DKM 43.11–14, facsimile ed. [32].6–8). "And the other gēlığ creations, as to their mēnōg, the Amahraspand, who are their selfness, are immortal, and as to their form are corruptible. Man is in the same category."

In addition to the previous categories of mēnōg, every group of mēnōgs may have a mēnōg idea or chief of its own. We thus

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58 A mēnōg which represents the totality of a species can be often defined either as denoting a collective of beings or a corresponding abstract notion. Nyer's contention that all abstracts in Iranian are merely 'disguised' collective nouns (*Die Religionen des alten Iran*, p. 87) does not carry conviction. The opposite can be claimed with equal validity.
59 The original Avestan term for this idea is *ratu* (cf. Yasna 12), sometimes reflected in the Pahlavi term *rad*. Cf. the note of J. Darmesteter in his *Zend-Avesta*, (Reproduction photographique) Paris 1960, I, p. 122f., n. 1.
60 This is a probable, though not entirely proven, deduction from certain references which are found in the texts. Thus, in a passage which is concerned with repentance from a sin committed by a person, 'the demon in front of whom he committed that sin' (hān druz ke pēš wināh kard) has to depart from the body.
obtain several layers of mênôg, which differ from each other by the distance by which they are removed from the material world. Ohrmazd is regarded, in accordance with this conception, as the mênôg of (all) the mênôgs, the ideal prototype of all mênôg existence. The pure mênôg world, the world of Ohrmazd and the Amahraspands, as well as that of Ahreman and his host, is stated to be eternal. But there must be numerous mênôgs whose existence is ephemeral, or who are at least generated in time. These are, for example, the spirits of the good deeds and of the

of that man and to come in front of the mênôg demon (druzd i mênôg: Dēnḵoard VI, 315; DkM 544). The mênôg demon seems to be a prototype of the individual demons, themselves mênôg beings representing the sins committed by individual people. The arch-demon would seem to be called mênôg to distinguish it from those individual demons which are 'inherent' in the gêltîg world. Cf. also with regard to Ohrmazd, infra, note 62.

64 We encounter such epithets as: hân i ûhrmârd-e gêltîg xrad, hân i mênôgân xrad (Dādēstān i Dēnţîg XXXVI, 13, p. 78) ‘The wisdom of Ohrmazd, the mênôg wisdom’. Since every wisdom is a mênôg concept, the epithet may in this case stress the particularly elevated mênôg character attributed to the wisdom of Ohrmazd. Gêltîg seems also to have several layers of concreteness. In Dēnḵoard III, 365, the expression ‘the finest (or thinnest, keenest: dârmag-lom) gêltîg self’ is found, cf. Appendix D.

65 Óhrmîzd i weh dâhragân dâdâr āndar-ez mênôgân mênôg, u-š mênôgân-ez wîndîn âh *dâdâr i mênôgân ābar gêltîgân paydîg (Dâdēstān i Dēnţîg XXX; 4, Ankesetâr’s edition, p. 59): ‘Ohrmazd, the Creator of the good creatures, is a mênôg even among mênôgs. His being seen by the spirits is similar to what is known of the spirits being seen to gêltîg beings’. The same idea is expressed ibid., XVIII, 3: Óhrmîzd-ez āndar mênôgân mênôg, and XXXVI, 10: āwe ābar lom râz-nân xuwardagân xuwardâg-lom mênôgân mênôg-lom wîspagân Óhrmîzd i dâdâr. ‘He who is the highest of the luminaries, the most lord of the lords, the most spirit of the spirits, Ohrmazd the creator of all’—the peculiar syntax here may suggest an Avestan original to the formula (wîspagnân should be a genitive depending on dâdâr by analogy with weh dâhragân dâdâr in Dd XXX, 4, quoted above). The context makes it clear that what is meant is that Ohrmazd stands in the same relationship to mênôg beings as the latter in their turn stand with regard to the visible world. In Škund-gâmdâgik Vîdîr I, 2, andarīce mânînuč mânînuč, we should therefore translate accurately: ‘he is a mênôg even with regard to the (other) mênôgs’, who are like gêltîg in relation to him. (The translation ‘mênôg entre les mênôgs’, does not bring this point out with sufficient clarity). Chapter 208 of Dēnḵoard III (DkM p. 225f., facsimile ed., p. [176]f.; cf. Appendix D) presents a scheme according to which the mênôg and gêltîg products of Ohrmazd occupy each a supreme position in its class. Among all mênôg beings the mênôg product of Ohrmazd is endowed most with mênôg-ness; and the some applies to the gêltîg product of Ohrmazd.
bad deeds of man.\textsuperscript{63} We do not know whether predestination was taken to such an extreme position as to require the pre-existence of all the mênôg correspondences relating to the individual person, or of single events, but it is reasonable to assume that such individual mênôgs were considered to be manifestations of a general and eternal 'idea'.\textsuperscript{64}

Man constitutes a problem by itself in this scheme. Here, as in other fields, man represents on a smaller scale the same structural relationship, in this case between mênôg and gêliq, which obtains in the world. Man's existence in this world is preceded by a mênôg prototype, which seems to be eternally pre-existent, the frawašt, or frawahr in Pahlavi: the way in which the frawahr is transferred from mênôg existence to 'being clad in flesh' in the gêliq world is described in some detail in Dd XXXVI, 25f.\textsuperscript{65} His material existence in the actual world is a blend of a

\textsuperscript{63} mênôg i kirbag is mentioned in an eschatological rôle in Dd XXX, 2. The three spirits, representing the good thought, speech and deed of a wicked person, come to comfort him during the first three nights after his death, according to Dd XXVI, 4. Above, note 60, the expression 'that demon in front of whom the sin was done' was noticed. In Dk VI, 200 (DkM 535), we encounter the idea of a light (čôšâth) which emerges from a good thought, speech or action, leading the man towards dên, and likewise a darkness which is the outcome of an opposite situation. This idea has probably some affinity with that of a mênôg which represents pious deeds or sins, although it shows that the system of thought is not very tight in this respect.

\textsuperscript{64} The ambiguity is striking, and may be conscious, in chapter 137 of Dênakard III (DkM 140-142; facsimile ed., p. [106]f.). Thus, for example, where there is a scheme of gêliq-mênôg correspondences in the life of the individual person: gêliq tan (body) corresponds to mênôg ruwân (soul); similarly xwâsîg (possession), in gêliq, corresponds to kirbag (plous work) in mênôg; âzarn (honour) to frârân-luxûzîg (righteous effort); pûdxêxîg (rule) to dên (religion); hudahîšn (good instruction; dahišn, 'instruction', is to be discussed in another publication), to dûnâgîth (knowledge). Mênôg in these correspondences, it should be noticed, is not the 'idea' of its gêliq pair, but its pious counterpart.

\textsuperscript{65} The passage is treated in Appendix B. Of the extensive literature on the subject of the frawašt, H. Lommel's introduction to Yt. 13 in his Die Yaût's des Awesta, übersetzt und eingeleiadt, Göttingen-Leipzig 1927, p. 101ff., and R. G. Zaehner, The dawn and twilight of Zoroastrianism, p. 140f., may be pointed out. That frawahr is a permanent mênôg existence of man can best be seen in the passage of GBd 34.10ff. (text and translation in Bailey, Zoroastrian problems, p. 112): 'When during the period of the Assault people die, the body is joined to the earth, the jân to the wind, the čêwêng to the sun, the soul (ruwân) to the frawahr'.
purely material body, *tan*, also termed *karb*, and a ‘form’, *ēwēnag*, with a soul which marks his existence in the actual world, *ruwān*, the two being linked together by a vital soul, *jān*.

Man is defined as consisting of *tan* and *ruwān*, the latter perhaps signifying in this context all the *mēnōg* forces in man, in the following passage:

\[ ud hān ke xwadih a-marq u-š paymōzān sāwišnīh hamargānīhā mardom ī pad hān ī-šān xwadih ruwān a-marq, ud paymōzān ī tan andar qamezagīh sāwišnomand, pad hamim ī āqnēn xwānīhēd mardom ī pahlom hēnd gēlīg dahišnān (DkM 43.5ff.; facsimile edition, p. [32].2ff.). \]

“That whose self is immortal and whose clothing is corruptible is the totality of men, in whom the self, viz. the soul, is immortal, and the clothing, viz. the body, is corruptible in the state of mixture. They are called men by the combination of both. They are the best of the gēlīg creations”.

Further in the chapter *ruwān* is called ‘the guardian of the body’ (*ruwān ī pānag ī tan*, DkM 43.15, facsimile edition [32].9). in the moral literature, the opposition between *tan* and *ruwān* denotes the contrast between worldly values and the higher aims of religion, representing the contrast between gēlīg and mēnōg inside man.

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66 For the constitution of man in general we have a thorough study with a most valuable discussion of sources in the chapter entitled ‘Marlām’, p. 78ff., of H. W. Bailey’s Zoroastrian problems. On the terms *tan*, *karb*, *ēwēnag* see op. cit., p. 96 (where the three are apparently taken to be identical), and p. 118; the identity of *tan* and *karb* is certain. The two terms never come together, and they interchange as variants (cf. GBd 72.11, where DH has *kēp* for the text’s *kn*). The term *ēwēnag* seems however to be a distinct concept, though close in significance to the other two. The frequent occurrence of the pair *karb* *ud ēwēnag*, or in reversed order (cf. Bailey, loc. cit.) shows that the two are not identical. *Tan* and *ēwēnag* also come side by side, as for example: *tan abāz mirāġēd, ē-šān ēwēnag be dahēnd* (GBd 223.8; Bailey, p. 97): “He restores the body, then *ēwēnag* is given to them”. It may be assumed that *tan* or *karb* both mean the physical body, while *ēwēnag* means perhaps the ‘shape’ of the body. This would explain why *ēwēnag* ‘is implied’ in the *karb*, as noticed by Professor Bailey (loc. cit.).

67 The way in which *jān* and *ruwān* come from “mēnōg existence” to “being clad in gēlīg” is described in Da XXVII, 2.

The function of jān is defined in the following manner:

ôh-ez gušt *pēšēnig frazanagān ku jān ast mēnōg i zūōnag ha-r uš. tā ruwān ham-kadag i tan zindagith dārēd tan, wīdīd tan zindagīth ī ruwān ast (Dd XXII, 4).

"The ancient wise men said thus too: jān is the vivifying spirit between ruwān and lan. As long as the ruwān is a dweller of the body, it (jān) keeps the body alive. Once the body has departed, it is the life of the ruwān".

In the scheme which occurs in chapter 137 of Dēnkard III, visualized in the table given at the end of that chapter, jān occupies a mediating position between lan and ruwān, and also, interestingly, between gēlīg and mēnōg. Jān has an affinity with the wind, wād, which itself occupies an ambiguous position in the division of the world into mēnōg and gēlīg: it is not directly visible, but it is perceptible through its action.

The ethical or religious self of man has its own representation in the form of dēn, which also plays a part in his judgement after death, but which is at the same time an objective existence of a social and perhaps also cosmic nature. Man's activity in the actual world is marked by several mēnōg beings; there is, as it were, a mēnōg echo or reflection to every thought, speech or deed of man in the actual world. As a species man is represented in mēnōg by Ohrmazd, just as the other earthly elements are

69 DkM 140–142; facsimile edition, p. [106]f.; above, note 64, for a partial summary.
70 Cf., e.g., GBd 34.10ff., quoted above, note 65.
71 The ambiguity is already Avestan. The attempts to distinguish between two separate concepts miss a characteristic point of Zoroastrian thought, for this ambiguity is typical of mēnōg notions. On daēnā cf. above, note 16. As opposed to the fravashī, which is an eternal mēnōg person, dēn is chiefly man's religious consciousness in this world and his moral self after death.
72 Above, note 63.
73 GBd 33.15ff., 163.3ff.: u-š gēlīg davāg mard ī ahlau ke mard ī ahlau rāmēnīd ayāb bēštī ēg-eš Ohrmazd rāmēnīd ayāb bēštī bāvēd. "Hls (sc. Ohrmazd's) gēlīg mark is the righteous man. Whoever has caused a righteous man joy or affliction, has caused joy or affliction to Ohrmazd". Cf. Lommel, Die Religion Zarathustras, p. 106ff. On the mythological plane man is represented by Gayōmard.
6 Acta Orientalia, XXXIII
represented by the Amahraspands.\footnote{Cf. Lommel, loc. cit.} At the same time, however, by a different approach, every part of man is said to belong to a particular \textit{mēnōğ}: man’s non-material faculties belong to Ohrmazd, while the components of his body are divided between the Amahraspands.\footnote{GBd 196.I–5; cf. A. Gütze, \textit{ZII}, 2 (1923), p. 70; G. Widengren, \textit{The Great Yohu Manah}, p. 53.}

Apart from these instances, which belong to what may be called the \textit{mēnōğ} accompaniment to man’s earthly existence, there is also man’s involvement with the world of \textit{mēnōğ} beings, his relationship to the cosmic beings on the \textit{mēnōğ} plane. Man’s function on earth is to fight the demons and to help the good spirits,\footnote{\textit{ōhrmazd I xwaddi haw dām ēn-čez 2 sōd rāy dād, ṣbyad pad-eš absīhēndan ud gugāhīh ī xwēş rāy (DkM 502.12ff.; facsimile ed., p. [392].7ff.; Ms. K43, fol. 199v). “The Lord Ohrmazd created every creature even for these two benefits, in order to annihilate through it the Assault, and so as to have a witness for himself”. According to Adurbašt son of Zarvōšt every person should know the answer to a number of questions, one of which is: “For what purpose am I here (sc. in this world)?” (\textit{cēm ēdar hēm}. The correct answer is, “I am here in order to make the demons powerless” (\textit{a pādeškāy kardan ī drus rāy ēdar hēm}: DkM 573.18ff.; facsimile ed., p. [454]).} and the relationship formed between man and the cosmic spirits is quite intimate. The spirits, apparently both good and evil, wish to reside in man, and man’s duty is to try and drive away the evil spirits from him while making the good spirits take dwelling in him.\footnote{To quote but one example: \textit{... hamē tā mard kīrbag ud ahūyāh mēnēd ēg yad t ēndar lan ēndar lan mānēnd ud dēdēn staw bāwēnd ud be šawēnd (DkM 524.18ff.; facsimile ed., p. [412]f.). “As long as a man thinks pious deeds and righteousness, the gods which are in his body remain in the body, and the demons are beaten and depart”.} The phrase ‘a man’s \textit{Srōš}’, occurs, \textit{Srōš} being the spirit of obedience, one of the major divinities of Zoroastrianism.\footnote{Cf. the following quotation from \textit{Dēnkard VI}, 90: “Just as among vessels of gold, silver and other metals, those which are purer and freer from defects have sweeter sound, so also a man who is purer in the things of the gods and freer from defects in himself, \textit{... his Srōš produces the best sound \textit{...}} (\textit{ēg-eš srōş wāng ī pahłom barēd}: DkM 491; facsimile ed., p. [382]; Ms K43, fol. 19fr.). An alternative rendering of the latter phrase could be: “\textit{Srōš produces for him the best sound}”, which does not go against the observations offered here.} Such a phrase makes it possible to assume that the conception of divine spirits should be taken in a more abstract
manner than the apparent wording of many passages suggest; one must reckon with the possibility that certain mythological formulations were understood in a figurative sense. There is, it should be remembered, a high degree of abstraction in Zoroastrian literature right from the Gāthās, where the whole pantheon consists of terms which denote abstract ideas. Even when they are conceived in the most personified manner, they never seem to lose their character as concepts, as general abstractions. On the other hand, it is very likely that on the lower level of religion these expressions were taken literally, and the concepts of demonology, as well as those connected to the relationship between man and the good spirits, were understood in concrete form.

Man in the actual world is thus presented as the main battleground for the spirits. The outcome of the battle is in fact entirely dependent on man, the ultimate victory is effected by man's ability to vanquish the demons within himself. In this we have another instance to the 'echo' character of mēnōy: the fate of the mēnōy world is determined by the battle conducted here by man.

The relationship between mēnōy and ġēlīy, as we have seen it work in the actual world, can now be examined against the conception of eschatology. Eschatology presents a well-known problem in the history of religions, which I believe can be solved in the context of Iranian religion by reference to the structure outlined above. It consists in the Pahlavi texts of three distinct themes: individual eschatology (i.e., life after death, individual judgement and reward, paradise and hell), apocalypse (the cataclysm leading to the end of the world and the figure of the Saviour), and universal eschatology (resurrection, universal judgement, the rehabilitation of the world).

The problem arises from the duplication of events—the double ordeal, judgement and reward, resurrection coming after what

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79 This observation does not include, of course, the divine persons which do not form part of the original Zoroastrian system, such as Mithra, Anāhītā etc., or the mythological figures, such as Gayāmard etc.

80 Cf. Dēnkard VI, 130 (DkM 501; K43, fol. 198v.f.); 264 (DkM 530f.; K43, fol. 211r.).

81 As well as in the fully developed Judeo-Christian tradition. The clearest general account of the events of eschatology according to the Pahlavi sources is to be found in R. C. Zehner, The dawn and twilight of Zoroastrianism, p. 302ff. Several pertinent remarks are made by Molé, RHR 162 (1962), p. 211ff.
seems like eternal bliss in paradise for the righteous, etc. To quote J. Duchesne-Guillemin: 'Les âmes jouissent de la béatitude dans la Maison du Chant, dans la lumière, dans la présence de Dieu. Pourquoi faut-il alors qu'il y ait une résurrection? A quoi bon le corps, instrument de lutte, quand la lutte est finie?' That author concludes: 'Deux doctrines, évidemment, ont cherché à se combiner: celle de l'immortalité de l'âme et celle de la résurrection des corps' (La religion de l'Iran ancien, p. 352).

When we consider, however, that in the field of eschatology, just as in the parallel subject of creation, the interplay between mēnōg and gēliγ must have occupied an important position in Iran, whether completely consciously or only partly so, the conception of Zoroastrian eschatology may seem more coherent.

Interpreted in these terms, the first, or individual stage in eschatology means a transference of man, at death, from the material world into mēnōg. This removal follows a certain period of transition, during which it is apparently not entirely clear whether the separation of man's mēnōg aspect, notably the soul, and his body, is going to be final. This transition of the mēnōg parts of man at death back to the mēnōg world is compared to the birth of man, at which the same mēnōg constituents move from mēnōg to settle in gēliγ existence. In both cases this is a critical process, fraught with danger, and should be accompanied by the appropriate religious rites. Death is thus regarded as an inverse reflection of birth; it is the individual's birth into mēnōg.

82 The problem was earlier formulated by H. W. Bailey, Zoroastrian Problems, p. 116f. One ought however to remark that the observations on Dādestān 1 Dēng XXX, 9, on p. 117 of Zoroastrian Problems (followed by Duchesne-Guillemin), are not quite accurate. The text is: ud ānār l pad wīndāt ud kīrīg ābar wahīštγāγ ne bawē, swad anē ṭē nōgdγāγ šēfr puršīγ, ce ruwān l wīriγōγāγ be 6 wālit kard-ānārēh ud tuxt* wīndātēh ēdon rasēd *ku-š tā fraškard ānāh gāh ud 6 nōg ānār a-nīγāγ. "There is no reckoning for sins or pious deeds with the people of paradise. The question itself in this matter is surprising, for the souls of the departed reach paradise having their reckoning done and having their sins atoned for, in such a way that they have their place there until the Renovation and there is no need for a new reckoning". The question asked of Mānušēhr at the beginning of this chapter clearly referred to the problem of whether the just in paradise undergo reckoning while they are there, and Mānušēhr regards this as a 'surprising' question. There is no talk here of the problem of the double Judgement.

83 Cf. Dd XXVII.
When death in gêlig is total, the life of the soul after death begins, this being a summary and a judgement of life on earth. The descriptions of it in the Pahlavi literature suggest a dramatic reflection of man’s ethical accomplishment in actual life. This stage of eschatology, conducted as it is in purely mênôg terms, consists essentially of an ethical echo of one’s gêlig life.

Universal eschatology, on the other hand, is entirely enacted in gêlig. The events leading to the rehabilitation of the world, the events of the apocalypse, constitute a phase in the history of the world in which the battle between the two ethical principles becomes fiercest, and the conditions of material life sink lowest. The world undergoes a considerable worsening of its situation. This stage in the life of the world is comparable to the death pangs in the life of the individual. Then comes the final stage of eschatology. The world does not cease to be, nor does it stop being gêlig. But gêlig existence itself undergoes profound change. It is no longer a ‘mixture’ but is purified from evil and elevated.

öhrmazd abâg srôš-ahlaw ul êstêd ud srôš-ahlâyih az be zanêd, "Ohzmazd will stand up together with Srôš the Righteous. Srôš’s Righteousness will smite (the demon) Az (concupiscence), and Ohzmazd will smite the Evil Spirit. He will perform a sacrifice, and the earth will rise to the height of three spears... at the fifth sacrifice, it will reach the station of the stars and Garôdmân (the highest paradise) will descend from its place down to the station of the stars”.

The text goes on to say that Ohzmazd, the Amahraspands, all the gods and men will be together in one place. At the same time the world also sheds away some of the distinctive marks of

81 Cf. Bailey, Zoroastrian Problems, p. 117; Molé, Calle, mythe et cosmologie, p. 89. The same idea occurs also in Dkm 824.11 ff.; West SBE, XXXVII, p. 235) and Widengren (Hochgottlauhe, p. 119) understood the passage as containing a reference to Mithra, but this is unfounded.
materiality. There is no more hunger, thirst, old age or death. There is sexual satisfaction without procreation:

\[ \text{mardom pad tan dād ī 40 sūlag humānāg hamāg a-ūš ud a-maryg ud a-zarmān ud a-sāyīšn ud a-pāyišn (Pahlavi Rivāyat, p. 157.10ff.)} \]

\[ \text{ka-sān pas az hān gūst-xwarišnīh ne abāyēd pad hān cim rāy ce-sān pad harw zamān mazag xwašīh ī hamāg gūst andar dāhān ēstēd (ibid., p. 158.8ff.)} \]

"They will not need to eat meat, because they will have the sweet taste of meat always in their mouth'\(^8\);

\[ \text{ud mard ud zan ēwag abāg did kāmag banwēd rāyēnēnd ud kunēnd be-sān zāyišn ne banwēd (ibid., p. 158.12ff.)} \]

"men and women will have desire for each other and will satisfy it, but they will have no offspring'\(^8\).

In these details it is clear that the change that occurs in the eschatological existence does not imply a transformation in the essential nature of gēlīg; only what may be termed the unpleasant weight of gēlīg existence is removed, while pleasurable experiences lose nothing from their effect. The elevation or purification of gēlīg in eschatological times does not imply any negative attitude towards earthly pleasures, as has sometimes been concluded by scholars.\(^8\) This is gēlīg existence, one might say, which has become nearly mēnōg; or, more accurately, it has come as close to mēnōg as it is possible to do without ceasing to be gēlīg. For Zoroastrianism, the ideal type of existence is one which combines 'the best of both worlds', in a very literal sense.

Thus, if our interpretation is correct, there is a parallel movement in individual and universal eschatology. The individual moves from gēlīg existence (made worse by death pangs) over to mēnōg; the world moves from gēlīg existence (through a debased stage) over to a purified, mēnōg-like, gēlīg eschatological epoch.

\(^8\) Cf. also Dd XXXIV, 3.
\(^8\) Cf. also Pahlavi Texts, p. 107.
\(^8\) See R. C. Zaehner, The dawn and twilight of Zoroastrianism, p. 313.
In addition, however, the human mēnōg returns, in resurrection, to the purified gēṭīg of the world, and thus comes to its ultimate fulfilment, which is an existence in an elevated kind of gēṭīg where the distinction between mēnōg and gēṭīg is perhaps neutralized. The whole history of the world is seen as a kind of dialectic movement: from mēnōg creation into gēṭīg actuality, and thence into the reality of gēṭīg endowed with the advantages of mēnōg.88

APPENDIX A

mēnōg-waxš(ay)

The fixed idiomatic expression mēnōg-waxš, mēnōg-waxšg (or waxšg), which occurs in Dādestān i Dēnīg II, 13 (cf. above, p. 63), where it comes in antithesis to gēṭīg-ruvišnād, deserves to be noticed in detail.1 It seems to be characteristic of the style of Mānuścihr, though it occurs at least once outside the treatise Dādestān i Dēnīg, in DkM 350.5–7.2 The following passages help to establish the precise meaning of this expression.

jān ud ruwān ka az mēnōg-waxš be ō gēṭīg-paymōqīn ṛasēd (Dd XXVII, 2): “When the jān and the soul come from mēnōg existence to being clad in gēṭīg”.

88 If this attempt at a structural interpretation of Zoroastrian eschatology in terms of gēṭīg and mēnōg is accepted, it may conceivably be used as an argument in the old debate about the possibility of Iranian influence in the development of Judaico-Christian eschatology. The fact that the duplication of eschatological events makes good sense in Iran, forming as it seems to do an essential part of an organic whole, and the complementary fact that this is not the case in Judaism, should not be regarded as less significant than the observation, so often made in this connection, that certain eschatological themes are not to be found in the scanty remains of ancient Zoroastrian literature. There can be little doubt that the choice of themes which have survived in the fragments of the Avesta is not comprehensive.

1 Several examples are quoted by H. W. Bailey, Zoroastrian Problems, p. 118f. For the word waxš and its derivatives cf. also H. W. Bailey, BSOS, 6 (1930/32), p. 280f.; Zoroastrian Problems, p. 105, note 1 (in the example from GBd 178.15ff., quoted there, it would seem more natural to take waxšgīn as the antithesis to 4tanēgirdīb).

2 The whole chapter is given in Appendix D; it also contains similar expressions, such as: waxšgīmand mēnōgān (DkM 349.10ff.); mēnōg 1 waxš-nēṛīg, opposed to mēnōg 1 eṭhr-nēṛīg (ib., lines 7–8).
In this passage an idiomatic play on words occurs, similar to the one which can be noticed in Dd II, 13. The material counterpart to mēnōg-waxš here is gēlīg-paymōgīh.

az hān ceʾon pāsbaṇīh ud pānagīh i gēlīgān az dādār framān srōš-ahlāy xweškārīh, ud āmārgar-ez pad setōš ēwag srōš-ahlāy, hān i ruwān 3 rōz ud șāb mēnōg-waxš gāh andar gēlīg pānagihēd pad hān i srōš pādārīh ud āmārihēd pad-ez hān i srōš āmārīh (Dādestān i Dēnīg XXVII, 6): “As the preservation of and guardianship over gēlīg creatures is the work of Srōš the Righteous, by the Creator’s command, and the one who does the reckoning during the three days following death is also Srōš the Righteous alone—that soul [of a person who has just died] is guarded by the guardianship of Srōš and is reckoned with through the reckoning of Srōš for three days and nights, a period of mēnōg existence inside gēlīg”.

We notice here again that mēnōg-waxš comes in close relationship to gēlīg, though they do not form here a parallel.

harw 3 andar dāmān meh, u-š mehmānīh pad pahlomīgān mardān ahlawān, mēnōgīy, pad hān i abēzāg frawahr mēnōg-waxšīhā o druz kōxšāg ud spōzāg ud wānāg ud ānābāg, hān i yazdān spāh zōrēnāg, mēnōg xwadāqīh i āhrmazd. gēlīgihā, pad gēlīg paymōgīh, hambandih i tan ud jān (Dd I, 3): “All three are the greatest among the creatures. In mēnōg their residence in the best righteous men is by the fact that the pure frawahr is, in mēnōg existence, a fighter against the demons, one who rejects them, vanquishes them and weakens them, one who strengthens the army of the gods, the mēnōg lordship of Ohrmazd. In gēlīg (their function is) to connect the body to the jān by being clad in gēlīg”.

This passage is particularly illuminating as we have in it, besides the contrast mēnōg-waxšīhā: pad gēlīg-paymōgīh, also the explicatory opposition mēnōgīy — mēnōg-waxšīhā, which parallell gēlīgihā — pad gēlīg-paymōgīh.

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3 Cf. for this passage M. Molé, Culte, mythe et cosmologie, p. 475; M. F. Kanga, in Indo-Iranica, Mélanges G. Morgenstierne, Wiesbaden 1964, p. 100.
Another relevant passage is somewhat more difficult to interpret. The following reading is offered tentatively:

\[ \text{anóh hashpíhast ud ēstêd mēnōg-waxšīg hān î band-drubsṭīh ke-š harwisp bandān niqāh}\]  
\[\text{ud awēš xwad ast wuzurg xwarr ke-š harwisp bandān niqāh ud ën î abēzāq î gumān-wizār brāzihiast bāmīy ud dūr-pērēg ceʾon a-sazīšn-yazdān (?), star-pēsīd mēnōgān-lāšūd weh-dēn î mazēsnān, ēdōn-ez brāzīd rōšnān î purr-xwarrān (Dd XXXVI, 35): ‘There (sc. in Garōdmān) came to rest$^4$ and there stands in mēnōg existence that barricade-fortress which has the supervision of all barricades, and to it itself (belongs) the great splendour (xwarr), which has the supervision of all barricades; the pure religion, resolving doubts, shone, lustrous and with far-reaching radiance,$^6$ like the incorruptible gods (??),—the good religion of the Mazdeans, star-ornamented, fashioned by the spirits, thus also shone the luminaries full of splendour’.$^6$}

The passage is by no means lucid, partly because it is not easy to assign each of the epithets which it contains to its appropriate owner. It seems, however, that the ‘barricade-fortress’ in Garōdmān, the supreme heaven, is meant to represent the Mazdean religion, mentioned at the end of this passage.

APPENDIX B

\[ \text{stī}$^1$ \]

The word stī has two distinct uses. It designates an abstract notion, ‘existence, being’, as well as the individual possessor of

$^1$ For the verb hashpíh: cf. R. C. Zaehner, BSOS, 9 (1937–39), p. 901. The reading here is assured by the occurrence of the corresponding noun in a similar context earlier in the same chapter, in § 17 (Dd, ed. Anklesaria, p. 81): ud dwazēnd ò haspēn pad hān î amahraspdān abāgīk ud hān î dādār xwarr: ‘and they arrive for resting in the company of the Amahrspands and the xwarr of the Creator’.

$^2$ The word pērēg ‘radiance’ has two alternative spellings in the Pahlavi script: pyluk$^2$ (as given here and in DkM 421.6; 434.18), and the more archaic spelling puyuk$^2$ (Zātsprām V, 3; XXXV, 40).

$^3$ M. Molé, in RHR, 155 (1959), p. 150f., gives a different translation of this passage.

$^4$ See above, note 38 (p. 70), and the text from Dēnkard III, chapter 123.
being, a person or a thing. As there are a number of other terms for existence in Middle Persian, it would be of interest to try and define the meaning of stī more closely, in a way which would distinguish it from astīh, astīsh(īh), both of which designate 'being, existence'. The term astīh has a negative counterpart, nēstīh, and so it can be taken to imply the positive fact of being as against non-being. It occurs also in contrast to paydāgīh, the two forming the pair of notions 'being' and 'manifestation', in Dēnkard III, chapter 132 (Dkm 132f.; facsimile edition, p. [99]f.; cf. Zehner, BSOS, 9 (1937–39), p. 871f., 880):

abar astīh ud paydāgīh ud juttarih i astīh az paydāgīh.

"On being and manifestation, and the difference between being and manifestation".

The text of the chapter also contains a nice contextual contrast between astīh and stī:

*astīh hamāyyīg ohrmazd-dādār, ud dēn-dānāgīh i-š pad nērōg, ud *gāh ud-gyāg i-š stī abar, ud zamān i-š ast hamāyyīgīh.

paydāgīh i-šān astīh hān i ohrmazd-dādār az dahišn kardagīh, hān i dēn-dānāgīh saxwan i kāmīg ud dānāgīhā kār, hān i zamān ud gāh pad zamān andar gyāg dādan sāgastan-ez i dahišn.

ud juttarih i astīh az *paydāgīh ēn-ez ka hān astīh [ī] abē-paydāg *be ō mardom pad-xwadīh būd, was būdan sāyēd: a-bun, bun ud bunūmand ast i a-paydag ō mardom, ud ne hēc paydāgīh i abē-astīh būdan sāyēd.

"Being is: the eternal Ohrmazd, the Creator; the knowledge of religion which he has in his power; space and place upon which his stī is found; time which is his eternity.

The manifestation of their being is: as for Ohrmazd the creator, from the activity of creation; as for the knowledge religion, speech which expresses will and action done with knowledge; as for time and space, to be able to create in time and place.
The difference between being and manifestation is this: when a non-manifest being belongs to a man's selfness, it can be of many (kinds): it is either without root, (being itself) a root, or having a root, and is non-manifest to man.

There can be nothing manifest which lacks being.”

The term astiθ clearly refers to the fact of being: stiθ can be said here to imply the being of a particular individual: this meaning will be discussed further in this Appendix.

If astiθn has a characteristic connotation which would differentiate it from astiθ, it probably is the fact of being in a place or in time: astiθn does not seek to affirm the existence of an object or a person, but rather to define and attach or relate it. The contrast between astiθn and stiθ is seen in the following passage:

*abar astiθn ud winirθn i harw 2 mēnōg pad xwēθ stiθ (Dkm 831.17–18): “On the existence and the arrangement of the two mēnōgs in their own (mode of) being”.*

The term stiθ ought, apparently, to be taken in a more restricted meaning than that of astiθn: it seems to designate a manner or mode of being. A similar meaning can be noticed in the following passage:

*bawθn stiθ i pad hamih i nērōg i waxēθ ud zōr i mēnōg gōhr av dādār mēnōgī bawθnīdārθ (Dkm 345.6–8): “bawθn is a (mode of) being which the creator brings into existence in mēnōg form through the conjunction of the power of waxēθ and the force of the mēnōg substance”.*

A definition using similar terminology is given to ham-bawθn (Dkm 345.8–10). In the passage quoted above, Dk III, chapter 123 (Dkm 120.15 ff.), the word stiθ is used in the same manner.²

² In the term which occurs in the theological discussions of the process of creation, bawθn-astiθnθ, and which comes in opposition to bawθn-raωθnθ (see further below in this Appendix), the element astiθn can be taken to imply the stage in which ‘becoming’ comes to be established and fixed, whereas in bawθn-raωθnθ the movement and change are probably implied.

² Likewise in Śkand-gumānθ Vēθ IV, 16, 21: stiθ i rōṣand in the Pazand text (in the edition of J. de Menasce transcribed in both case stiθ but translated gēlθh,
As stī seems to designate a mode of being, it is often qualified by an adjective or some other qualifier which specifies the particular kind of existence intended. Thus several occurrences of the combination rōšn stī 'luminous entity' are recorded:

\[
\text{abar dōzānīh ī arš dēw ud jud-bunīh ī rōšn ud tam, ud wehīh ī hān ī rōšn stī pad wīzīn ud waršī ud wādīh ī hān ī tam (DkM 829.5–7):}
\]

"On the deceit of the demon Arš, and the separate origin of light and darkness, and the goodness of the luminous being through choice and action, and the evil of the dark (being)".\(^4\)

The soul of man is also said to be rōšn-stī 'of luminous existence', or 'luminous entity' (DkM 18.13; 286.6, 14 f.).\(^5\)

Another adjective which is found to qualify stī is gēlīgīg:

\[
\text{ud ka ō gil-paymāḡīh ī stī ī gēlīgīg paymāḡīh frēstihast (DkM 434.12–13, facsimile ed., p. [493]):} \text{"when he (sc. Zoroaster) was sent to appear in a garment of clay, which is gēlīg (mode of) being".}
\]

The same process is described in similar terms with regard to a different subject in the following passage:

\[
\text{u-š brihēnīd be ō pitān-paymāḡīh ī xwad ast stī ī [ī] paymāḡīh-ez gil ī *lanīg ahlawān frawahrān (Dd XXXVI, 25; cf. H.W.}
\]

probably an error of oversight. The term is properly interpreted in the glossary and the detailed commentaries).

\(^4\) The term is somewhat differently translated in M. Molé, *Culde, mythe et cosmologie*, p. 205.


\(^6\) The reading gil-paymāḡīh, literally 'being clothed in clay', is undoubtedly right. H. W. Bailey reads karp-patmāḡīh (cf. following note), but the text has only one -p-. The reading gil- is confirmed by DkM 816.13 gil-karb (cf. H. W. Bailey, *Zoroastrian Problems*, p. 29), where the word gil is written by the ideogram TYNA. Cf. also Pahlavi Rīvāyad, ed. Dhabhar, p. 136.12 f.: u-š mardom av hān gil ke-š gayūmard az-eš kard . . ., and the expression gil-štāh, used as an epithet of Gayūmard (DkM 29.1 f.), which survives in NPersian (cf. *Burhān-i Qāfī*, ed. Mo‘īn, III, Tehran 1342, p. 1826 f.).

The notions mēnōg and gēlīg in the Pahlavi texts


"He fashioned forth the righteous frawahr towards being clad in flesh, which by itself is a (mode of) being whose garment is the bodily clay".

The text goes on to describe the process by which the fravāši come to material existence:

u-š payrāst ku zamānag zamānag pad xwēš gōhrag ēstēnd ud rasēnd be ō gēlīg paymōgīh, hān ī gilān-ramag-et, tā bawandag ō hān ī zamānag kār zāyēnd... (Dd XXXVI, 26; Molé, loc. cit.) "He established that from time to time they should stand by their own substance and come to the garment of gēlīg, that which is of the flock of clay, until there are born in order to accomplish the work of the time (the following persons:)..."

In these two passages sī and paymōgīh stand in close proximity to each other and seem to correspond to gēlīg-paymōgīh, but the best sense of the text seems to be obtained when we do not try to emend one of the two expressions so as to conform to the other, thus achieving perhaps a superficial parallelism.

The term sī occurs also in a Pahlavi summary of the lost Spand Nask of the Avesta as one of the aspects of the human existence of Zoroaster, in the series sī, frawahr, xwār,—a series of notions from which it is obvious that sī cannot be taken to denote merely 'existence'. Each of these notions was first created in mēnōg and then transferred into gēlīg (DkM 690.12–14).8

The concept of sī is clearly and sharply defined in chapter 194 of Dēnkarīd III (DkM 207–208). The process of the world's creation is analyzed as consisting of four stages, starting from bawīšn, which is defined as unformed, primary matter. The simile for this stage in the organic world is the parent with regard to his offspring; in the human world the simile is that of the raw material from which the artisan fashions an object. The second aspect in this process is the one called bawīšn-rawišnīh, defined as the

8 Cf. Molé, Culte, mythe et cosmologie, p. 276f.
form (désag) given to the offspring inside the parent and to the object by the artisan. The next stage, or aspect, in this process is \textit{bawšn-astišnih}, which seems to signify, by a simile, the embryonal stage in the organic world and the elementary stage of fashioning forth a material object by an artisan. The whole process is finished by the emergence of \textit{stī}, which is the completed, individuated, fully-qualified being:

\begin{quote}
u̲d\ n̲št̲ī\ \textit{wimandīg} ṫw̲-l̲a̲g̲w̲i̲g\ \textit{lanān}, ce̲‘̲on w̲ah̲m̲ān̲\ c̲īx w̲ah̲m̲ān̲ k̲as, c̲īhrīg, ce̲‘̲on b̲aw̲w̲an̲d̲ag nig̲ārd̲aq̲īg̲ i̲ z̲ahag andar burd̲ār uruβw̲ar,\n\end{quote}

9 ud kir̲r̲ōg̲īg, nāmc̲īš̲īg abisar ud dēm i kir̲r̲ōg zarr̲r̲ēg̲ar az zarr, ud nāmc̲īš̲īl taw̲t̲x̲ī ud dər i kir̲r̲ōg dōrg̲ar az dər kūn̲ēd; ud stī būdag ast i az bawš̲n-astišnih, [ce̲‘̲on dēn gōw̲ēd k̲u az bawš̲n-astišnih]\n\begin{quote}
be stī fr̲āz būd. ud az stī nāmc̲īš̲īg cīx ud k̲as ud kār i hān cīx ud k̲as, ce̲‘̲on dēn gōw̲ēd k̲u az stī be hān i andar harw 2 mēn̲ōg ū ham būd, fr̲ār̲ōn̲īg ud abār̲ōn̲īg (DkM 208.14–22, cf. facsimile ed. p. [162].17–[163].3): \“The definition of \textit{stī} is the individual bodies, like such-and-such a thing, or such-and-such a person; (as regards) nature, as the complete acceptance of form of an offspring in the womb, (as regards) craftsmanship, a particular crown or diadem which a skilled goldsmith makes of gold, or a particular bed or door which a skilled carpenter makes from wood. \textit{Stī} comes into being from \textit{bawšn-astišnih}, [for the Religion says that from \textit{bawšn-astišnih} \textit{stī} was fashioned forth. From \textit{stī} the particular things and persons (come into being), and the work of those things and persons, as the Religion says: From \textit{stī} those which are in the two \textit{mēn̲ōgs} were constituted, namely righteousness and wickedness\”.
\end{quote}

9 The double designation for ‘womb’: \textit{burdār uruβw̲ar}, in which the first term is the Middle Persian word and the second a transcription of the Avestan word, occurs also in DkM 496.3–4.

10 The phrase in brackets can be supplemented with some confidence by the parallelism with the other sections in this chapter. Without it the sentence is incomplete.

11 [Cf. J. de Menasee, \textit{Pratidānam}, p. 195 f., n.] R. C. Zaehner, \textit{The dawn and twilight of Zoroastrianism}, p. 201 ff., discusses this chapter as well as chapter 191, mentioned further below. His approach calls for some reservations, I do not think it is justified to call the views presented in this chapter “a purely mechanicistic
A quotation from the 'Religion', i.e., the Avestan tradition, regards stī as being the final stage of differentiation, after which comes only the stage of moral divisions between righteousness and wickedness.

A parallel text to the one just quoted, chapter 191 of Dēnkard III, presents the process of creation from a different point of view: it describes how the world moves from mēnōg to gēlīg in two stages, called āfurišn and daḫišn. But that text, though using traditional terminology, tries to harmonize it with philosophical ideas, chiefly Aristotelian, it seems:

"The word āfurišn is: the creation (is) first in mēnōg, that is, matter and mēnōg seed; and it is shown in gēlīg in potentiality" (cf. Appendix D).

The word daḫišn is defined further in the text as the transference of creatures from mēnōg-being to gēlīg-being, or in other words as a realization of that which was in potentia. This Aristotelian view is then brought into syncretism with the former scheme, which seems to be a traditional Zoroastrian one. Thus the stage called bawišn is equated with the state of being in potentia (pad-nērōg), and is further said to be called 'the seed of seeds, unformed stī'. The following stages, bawišn-rawišnīh and bawišn-astišnīh, are then defined in terms which conform to this approach. The last stage, which in chapter 194 of Dēnkard III was called stī, is here, in chapter 191, named ān, 'body', person (DkM 203.14), which reminds one of the definition given above to stī

and atheistic doctrine which was grafted on to the Avesta' (op. cit., p. 203). The fourfold scheme: bawišn, bawišn-rawišnīh, bawišn-astišnīh, stī, seems to me to belong to the original Zoroastrian tradition. This can be seen from the constant references to dēn, which usually designates a quotation from an Avestan source. These quotations contain all four terms. Besides, the effort made in chapter 191 to harmonize between the twofold Aristotelian conception of potentiality and actuality and our fourfold scheme strengthens the view that this scheme is part of the local tradition. The harmonizing attempt of chapter 191 is not crowned with striking success. The two views are presented there side by side and are not interwoven into a single system. It is true that the creator is not mentioned in chapter 194 of Dēnkard III, but this does not yet prove that the conception is atheistic: the chapter's concern is merely to describe the mechanism of creation. The creator is mentioned in chapter 191 (see Appendix D).
by the phrase ḫw-tāqyū lanān ‘the individual bodies’. (The whole chapter is given in Appendix D).

ṣṭī, “the differentiated being, the existent person”, gives meaning also to the following passage, which has been elucidated by J. de Menasce:

u-š lawān pad hān ī andar šāyēn frawastag kanāragāmand, ud pad hān ī a-brīn a-kanārag; ce’n kanāragāmandīh-ez ī-š pad ṣṭī, ud a-š kanāragīh ī-š pad zamānag (DkB 199.4–6; facsimile edition, p. [155]); cf. R. C. Zaehner, BSOS, 9, 1937–39, p. 872, 880; J. de Menasce, ŠGV, p. 42). “His being powerful is limited as regards that which is included within that which is possible, it is unlimited as regards that which is undecreed. Similarly, that which he has in individual existence (ṣṭī) is limitation, and that which he has in time is limitlessness”.

Another text where the word ṣṭī signifies ‘individuated existence’ seems to be the following:

zamān xwad hamē, u-š xwadīh drang, ud pad-eš ast kardārīh ī nērōg ī ṣṭī ast hamāyiīg hān ī-š pad nērōg. u-š kanārag jumbišn ī ṣṭī andar wāy̱ pad spās, ce’n rōšnān wāzišn ud wād wāyišn ud āb tāzišn ud urvar rōğišn ud harw wir kār andar wāy̱ . . . (DkB 207.3–7; facsimile edition, p. [161]); Cf. Zaehner, BSOS, 9, 1937–39, p. 872, 880 f.).

“Time by itself is eternal. Its selfness is of long duration. The effectiveness in it is the power of individuated being (ṣṭī). It is eternal as regards that which is in its power, its limitation is the movement of an individuated being (ṣṭī) inside the atmosphere (?) through space. Such is the procession of the luminaries, the blowing of the wind, the flow of water, the growth of plants, and the action of every man inside the atmosphere (?) . . .”.

This passage, connected as it is to the previously quoted one, sheds some light on it and is in its turn made intelligible by the aid of this comparison.
This definition of sīlī as an individuated being stands very close to the use of the word sīlī in order to designate separate entities, whether mēnōy or gēlīy. Thus, in chapter 51 of Dēnkard III, the Anahraspands are said to belong to the class of ‘invisible beings’ (a-wēnišnīg sīlān, DkM 42.11f.), and the sun is mentioned as an example of ‘visible beings’ (wēnišnīg sīlān, DkM 42.20f.), cattle and men are enumerated among ‘gēlīy beings’ (wēnišnīg sīlān, DkM 43.9–11), each of which classes has various characteristics which do not concern us here.

The following text seems also to use the term sīlī in the sense of an individual being, although the translation of the passage is not certain:

\[ ud \ \text{andar} \ \text{hān} \ \text{i bād} \ \text{pahlomān} \ \text{hu-xwadāyān} \ \text{hu-xwadāy yim} \ \text{pahlom} \ \text{bād, kardār-tom} \ \text{sīlī} \ \text{pad} \ \text{ruwān} \ \text{i mardom} \ \text{ud} \ \text{pad} \ \text{tan,} \ \text{ud} \ \text{az} \ \text{pahlomān} \ \text{dēn-dastwarzān} \ \text{spīlāmān} \ \text{zardūšt} \ \text{pahlom bād, kardār-tom} \ \text{sīlī} \ \text{pad} \ \text{ruwān} \ \text{i mardom} \ (\text{DkM 334.6–10, facsimile ed., p. [256]}) \]

“Among those who were best beneficent rulers, the beneficent ruler Yima was the best, the most effective entity as regards the soul of men and their body. Of the best authorities of religion, Zoroaster the Spīlamīd was the best, the most effective entity as regards the soul of men”.

APPENDIX C

\[ dmšn \]

The reading of the word \textit{dmšn}, which occurs in the passage Dādeslān i Dēnīg XXVI, 3–5, is not known to me. The contexts in which the word occurs seem to favour an interpretation which would connect it to a theoretical verb \textit{dam-} (probably unconnected with ‘to breathe’) or \textit{jam-} (which could be Old Iranian \textit{gam-}), with a meaning ‘to have an evil effect, to come forth, to issue (in a bad sense)’.

\[ ^{12} \text{The sun seems according to this scheme to belong to mēnōy, although it is visible.} \]

\[ ^{13} \text{M. Molé, \textit{Culte, mythe et cosmologie}, p. 38f., gives a different translation of this text.} \]

\[ ^{1} \text{See above, p. 73.} \]

\[ ^{7} \text{Acta Orientalia, XXXIII} \]
The word occurs in the following passages:

I. The text already mentioned above, Dd XXVI, 5:
   u-š dmšn az bun-kadag i anāgīh, “its evil effect is from the source of evil”.

The whole of that passage (quoted above, p. 73) gains in clarity by comparison to the parallel text in Dd XXV, 3–5, where the goodness and pleasure of paradise are described:

   u-š andar ast hamāq āsānīh ud rāmišnīh ud urwahm ud šēdāgyīh ud nēwagīh i wēš ud wēh az-ez hān i mahist ud abardom nēwagīh ud rāmišn i pad gētīg. u-š nēst hēc niyāz ud dard ud bēš ud duš-xxwārīh. u-š xwašīh ud nēwagīh jahān az hān i hamēšag-sūd gāh ud ganz i purr i a-kahišn an-absišīn a-kanārag. “There is in it all ease and joy and happiness and brilliance and goodness which are more and better even than the greatest and highest goodness and joy which are in this world. There is no want, pain, affliction or unpleasantness. Its sweetness and goodness spring from the place of everlasting benefit, from the full treasure which never diminishes, which is undecaying and unlimited”.

The precise parallel to dmšn in XXVI, 5 seems to be jahān in XXV, 5.² In both cases the words in question signify the movement from the source to the places of goodness or evil.

II. xwad ka xwad wałtarīh pad abārīgān tawānīgān meh-zorān wēš-dmšnyx i az-eš anāgīh rāy gēhān ziqān-tar ud wałtar pāyag pāyag tā hān i abardom, *ce pad hān i avar anāgīh ud ziqān az-eš frāy “ku pad hān i azēr (DkM 41.14 ff.; facsimile ed., p. [30]f.). “The same evil in highly-placed people, in mighty ones and in those endowed with great power, is more

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² jahān, ‘arising from, originating from’, is connected to the verb jastan, jah- ‘to jump, spring, come about’. In the same chapter of Dādestān i Dēng there occurs also an adjective derived from it: jahānīg (Dd XXV, 7), ‘inconstant, ephemeral’, or perhaps ‘originated’, like Arābī meṣudth (?). G. Widengren, The Great Vohu Manah, p. 84, reads here yadēn. [Both passages are now given by P. Gignoux in JA, 1968, p. 230 f., 236 f.]
harmful to the world and is worse, advancing by degrees up to the highest one, because evil issues more from them. For evil and harm are more from those above than from those below”.

The phrase *weš-dmšnyx * i az-eš anāgih rāy in this passage has a good counterpart in the same chapter of Dēnkard III: *nēwagih weš-waxšīšnih rāy* (DkM 41.4): “because goodness grows more”.

III. Our word occurs twice more in the same chapter (Dēnkard III, Chapter 50):

> *garān-dmwwšl ud *weš ziyān-tar* (DkM 41.21 f.): “having graver evil effect and more harm”.

> *abāg kast ud winast wehīh grāy *dmwwšl* [written: *xmwwšl*] *ud garān ziyān-tar az harw wadih* (DkM 42.5 f.). “When good diminishes and becomes defective, there is more evil effect and graver harm from every evil”.

IV. *u-š o hayyārīh i hān razmīgān ēstēniḍ dōgān-ez wasān parīgān lamīgān-goḥrān, ke-šān paymuṣṭ rah i rōṣnīgān, ku padēnd ud duwārēnd ud gardēnd azēr rōṣnān wāzīšīgān pad rāh-dārīh i andak (?) mēnōgān, ud gēlīgān nihumbišn hān i awē-šān rōṣnīh ud xwarr, ud *apparēnd hān i az awē-šān xiwarr-baxšīšnih, ud dmšnyx az awēs o dāmān xīndagīh-ez i ast dard ud mard hamnīšt anāgīh i mān o-šān dēw* (Dd XXXVI, 44; Anklesaria ed., p. 90). “In order to assist those doing battle, he (sc. Ahreman) stationed very many pari-s of dark substance, who clothed themselves in the carriage of the luminaries, so that they might revolve and run and turn round underneath the rotating luminaries, by robbing the lesser (?) spirits, and hiding from material beings the light and splendour which is theirs, and so that they might snatch away the dispensation of splendour which comes from them, and issue from their own to the creatures disease, namely pain and death, together with (other) evil which is appropriate (?) to those demons”.
APPENDIX D

A selection of texts for the relationship of mēnōg and gēlig

I. Dēnkard III, Chapter 191.


See above, note 55, p. 76, and Appendix B (p. 95 f.).

TEXT

abar ('w') āfurišn ud dahišn i dādār-ōhrmazd dām. az nigēz i weh-dēn.

(1) hād āfurišn ēwāz dām fradom pad mēnōgih i ast mādag ud tōhmag i mēnōgig, ud pad nērōg gēlig nīmāyišn, ce'ōn *pašm ke rištag *wahān-ez, ud zarr ke abisar-ez, ud sēm ke jām-ez, ud āhen ke bil-ez, ud dār ke dar-ez, ud bun ke bar-ez, ud zahāg ke zahag, ud abārig mādag ke xwēšig dahīg pad-nērōg.

(2) ud dahišn ēwāz dām az mēnōgih o gēligih wardēnīdan, i ast dahīg az mādag i-š pad nērōg būd, ce'ōn rištag az pašm, ud abisar-ez az zarr, ud jām-ez az sēm, ud bil-ez az āhen, ud dār-ez az dār, ud bar az bun, ud zahag az zahāg, ud abārig dahīg az hān i-š xwēš mādag.

(3) ud bun mādag i dahīg pad nērōg xwānīhed-ez tōhmagan tōhmag ud a-dēsīdag sī ud dahīgān bunyašt, u-š dēnīg nām bawīšn-ez.

(4) ud miyānag-ez mādag ast dahīg [i] pad nērōg, ce'ōn ādur ud āb, ke-sān pad nērōg zindag-ez dēsagān, xwānīhed tōhmag dēsag-ez, fradom azeših, sī bunyašt, u-š dēnīg nām bawīšn rawīšnīh.

(5) ud abdom mādag pālūdag az-eš dahīg, ce'ōn mardom az-eš mādagīh hān i xwad ham-karb, ce'ōn pid mādag ast i hān i xwad ham-karb pus, xwānīhed-ez *sōhišn (?) dēsag, u-š *dēnīg nām bawīšn-astišnīh, ke-s azēr ēwāzīg tan i ēd and mardom u-šān kār i and *gōnīh (?).
TRANSLATION

On āfūrīšn and dahīšn of the creation of Ohrmazd the Creator. From the instruction of the Good Religion.

(1) The word āfūrīšn (means:) the creation is first in mēnōy, that is matter and mēnōy seed, and it is shown in gēlig in potentiality, like the wool which is the cause of the thread, gold of the crown, silver of the goblet, iron of the spade, wood of the door, root of the fruit, the parent of the offspring, and the other kinds of matter whose own products are (in them) in potentiality.

(2) The word dahīšn (means:) to turn creation from mēnōy existence to gēlig existence, which is the product (emerging) from the matter where it was in potentiality, just like the thread (coming) from wool, crown from gold . . . (etc.), and the other products from that which is their own matter.

(3) The root matter, (in) which the product is in potentiality, is called 'seed of seeds', 'unformed (mode of) being', the foundation of the products'. Its religious name is bawišn. 3

(4) The middle matter is potentially the product, 4 like fire and water, to whom belong in potentiality the living forms. It is called 'the seed of form', 'the first production', 'the foundation of existence'. Its religious name is bawišn-ravišnīh.

(5) The last matter is one from which its product is refined, like a man whose matter is of the same shape as himself, just as a father is the matter of his son who has the same shape as himself. It is called 5 perceptible 5 form. Its religious name is

1 On the distinction between the verbs āfrīdan and dādan see above, p. 67 f., note 30.
2 The term dēnōy refers presumably to the Avestan name, the Pahlavi equivalent of which is given, just as the formula ceʾn gōvēd pad dēn, "as he says in the Religion", regularly introduces a quotation from the Avesta.
3 bawišn means literally 'becoming'. The connection between this term and the concept of 'root-matter' seems somewhat far-fetched, and this fact may strengthen the impression that we are faced here with two systems whose origins are different and which are only being harmonized with some effort. The formal justification for connecting bawišn with bun-māwdag may lie in the potential quality of the latter, i.e. that it can be realized only in its products.
4 The formula here resembles closely that which is found in the previous paragraph, in both cases the text has dahīš pad nētōy. The translation reflects an attempt to interpret the phrase in two different ways according to the context.
5 *sōhišn: the text has dyaʾ xsw-. The normal reading of the phrase as written
bawišn-astinīh, under which appellation (♀)⁶ are the bodies of so many people⁷ and their work of so much variety (♀).

II. Dēnkard III, Chapter 206.


See above, p. 78, note 62. Owing to the difficulty of the text, the translation should be regarded as merely tentative.

TEXT

abar ohrmazd xwad, xwadih, u-š mēnōg ud gēlig nām, ud paydāgīh, ud anē⁸ jud, ud az-eš. az nigēz i weh-dēn.

1) hād ohrmazd xwad abzōnīg mēnōg, wisp-wēhih nērōg stl.
2) u-š xwadih passazag. "xwad-ē⁹ harw mēnōgīg ud gēligīg weh, wehīh azešīh.
3) u-š mēnōg andar azešīh i harw a-wēnišīg a-gišišīg ciš i weh. pad hamāg mēnōg, mēnōg-tomīh i mēnōg menēnd.
4) u-š gēligīg andar azešīh i harw wēnišīg gišišīg ciš i weh. pad hamāg gēligīg i weh, gēlig-tomīh i gēligān xwad-ē.
5) u-š mēnōg-gēligīg andar azešīh i harw wēnišīg a-gišišīg, gišišīg a-[wēnišīg] ciš i weh. pad hamāg mēnōg-gēligīg i weh, mēnōg-gēligān mēnōg-gēligīg.
6) u-š xwadih arzānīgīh i spanāg-mēnōg ī dādār-ohrmazd, ud yazd ī abārig ham passazag.
7) u-š paydāgīh xwadihā.
8) anē jud hamēg azešīg ī jud az awei azešīh, ud ē awei azešīh xwad a-passazag pad azešīh.
9) harw azešīh pad xwadih winardan šāyastan rāy hān azešīh az anē ī awei hām-passazag, xwad sāzed, i-š nām xwadih arzānīg.

could be xwañhēd ce'ān hu-āsag, which conveys nothing intelligible. For sāhīn cf. H. W. Bailey, Zoroastrian Problems, p. 97, n. 2, and p. 229, and the passages collected by J. de Menasce, ŠGY, p. 239 (see also there, Addenda et Corrigenda, ad p. 284). Also Transactions of the Philological Society, 1959, p. 111, n. 2 (H. W. Bailey).

⁶ Both reading and translation of the whole sentence are doubtful.
⁷ An alternative translation may be: "so many individual people", taking tan as signifying 'an individual person'.
⁸ anē: written zk'd. Cf. other examples for this spelling in Pahlavi Yasna and Visperad, ed. B. N. Dhabhar, Bombay 1949, p. 115.
⁹ xwad-ē: Ms xwālwek'd.
(10) gannāg-mēnōg marzēnīdārīh, ud dēw ud druz i ābārīg ham-passazag.
(11) u-š paydāgīh az xwad azešīh.
(12) kēš-dārān ke xwad jumāy nēwag yazd azešīh kēš i-sān, abar yazd gannāg-mēnōgīh-ez guft, ud spanāg-mēnōg azeš be guft bawēd.

TRANSLATION

On Ohrmazd himself, his selfness, the name of his mēnōg and gēlig, the manifestation, that which is different, the product. From the instruction of the Good Religion.

(1) Ohrmazd himself is the beneficent mēnōg, an entity endowed with the power of doing all-good.

(2) To his selfness the individual self of every good mēnōg and gēlig being corresponds. Goodness is the product.

(3) His mēnōg is (found) in the product of every invisible and intangible good thing. In the whole of mēnōg, it is considered to be the most endowed with mēnōg-ness of mēnōg.

(4) His gēlig is (found) in the product of every visible and tangible good thing. In the whole of gēlig, it is a self most endowed with gēlig-ness of gēlig beings.

(5) His (compound) mēnōg-gēlig is (found) in the product of every visible and intangible, (or) tangible and intangible good thing. In the whole of (compound) mēnōg-gēlig existence, it is the mēnōg-gēlig (par excellence) among mēnōg-gēlig beings.\(^{10a}\)

(6) His selfness is the worth of the Bounteous Spirit of the Creator Ohrmazd. The other gods are similar.

(7) His manifestation is according to the self.

(8) 'The other' is all product that is different from his own product, and that by itself does not correspond to his product for being (his) product.

(9) In order to be able to arrange every product through selfness, that product, (as distinguished) from 'the other' which

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\(^{10}\) *ane jud*: both words signify approximately the same thing. The addition of *ju*d may be a gloss to help in identifying the uncommon *ane*, written with an ambiguous spelling. The more regular spelling of *ane*, with the ideogram *AXRN*, is no less ambiguous.

\(^{10a}\) Cf. G. Gnoli, *AION*, N.S. 13 (1963), p. 189 n. 82, who refers to GBd 194.8 for this concept.
resembles it, is by itself suitable. Its name is 'worthy of the
selfness'.

10 The Ev\'l Spirit is destruction; the ďēw and the other
demons resemble him.

11 His manifestation is the product which comes from him-
self.

12 Those who hold the view that the product of the gods is
bad together with good, apply (in fact) the nature of the Ev\'l
Spirit to the gods, and say (in fact) that the Bounteous Spirit
derives from him.

III. Dēnkard III, Chapter 365.


This chapter presents the 'evolutionary' process of the creation
of the world. See above, p. 69, n. 35. Cf. R. C. Zaechner, Zurvan,

TEXT

abar bun bawīšn ī ġētūg dahišn (dahišn), az nīgēz ī weh-dēn.

1 hād abzār ke dādār az hān ī anayr-röśnīn bīhēnīd ud
dām andar hangerdīgīnūd paydāgīh ī-š abastāgīg nām āthrō,
kahrpa 2. ēwag hān ī mēnōg dahišn, ēwag hān ī ġētūg dahišn
andar hangerdīgīnūd.

2 andar hān ī mēnōg dahišn andar hangerdīgīnūd mēnōg ī
waxš-nēṛōg, ud andar hān ī ġētūg dahišn andar hangerdīgīnūd
mēnōg ī cihr-nēṛōg.

3 wēšīšt abzār ī mēnōg dahišn hangerdīgīh kard spurīg,
ud pad-eš kār ī pad dahišn ī andar hān abzār abāyišnīgīh, u-š
wizārd waxšōmand mēnōgān yazdān ēwag ēwag ō hān ī-šān
(‘w) xweškārīh.

4 ud andar abzār ī ġētūg dahišn hangerdīgīh pad dādār kām
warzēn cihr-‘nēṛōg mēnōg pad dādan ī waxš-nēṛōg mēnōg
*hāmīghīā11 ō dārmag-tom ġētūg grīw paydāgīh.

5 fradom nihang ī-š abastāgīg nām kut, ud pad ēwāz ī
gēhān kyş (stīškī) sriṣūdag-ez xwānd.

11 The Ms has *xamīghā. The emendation is supported by analogy with hāmīgh, which occurs below, § 8, as an epithet of mēnōg.
(6) az nihang i kut srišüdag-ez nām wahānag (?), i-š abastāğīg nām xwardagīh ud gabrih-ez ud pad ēwāz i mardom stunag (?) kyš-ez (?) xwānēnd. ud xīg ast i kut u-š kut [kard]12 andar.

(7) ud az wahānag i xwardagīh ud gabrih ud stunag-kyš-ez nām *waśn i-š abastāğīg nām *wiškīdōmandih, ud pad ēwāz i mardom wistardagīh-ez xwānēnd. ud xīg ast i wahānag u-š wahānag kard-ez andar.

(8) ud az wašnīh i *wiškīdōmandih ud wistardagīh-ez nām waxš-nērōg i hamīg i fradom tan i-š abastāğīg rah ud spahr-ez nām, ud pad ēwāz i mardom spahr-ez xwānēnd, i-š zahag andar hēnd.

(9) rōšnān xwaršēd ud māh ud starān ham-bun o wisp dām i-š ēr, rāyēnidār ast i cihrān, ud xwač cihrān abardom.

(10) ud az rah bawīšn i garm-xwēd i wādōmand, pad ham-bastāğīh i druz i mēnōg-waxš, ham-zōrīhā zahag i ēlīg dahišnān i tōhmagan tōhmag.

(11) az bawīšn [bawīšn]-rawīshnīh i zahāgān i dahīg i bawīšn i xwānhēd ristagān-ez.

(12) az [bawīšn-rawīshnīh] bawīšn-astīshnīh i zindagān i-š andar gōspand ud mardom sti ke hēnd ēlīg *dahīg karb.

**TRANSLATION**

On the original 'becoming' of material creation. From the instruction of the Good Religion.

(1) The manifestation of the powers which the Creator fashioned from Endless Light and with which he accomplished the creation, —the Avestan name of which is 'the form of fire',13—is twofold. One is that with which he accomplished mēnōg creation, and one is that with which he accomplished ēlīg creation.

(2) In that with which mēnōg creation was accomplished, the mēnōg of spiritual force (is found), and in that with which ēlīg creation was accomplished, the mēnōg of substantial force (is found).

12 kard was probably omitted here by haplography, after kul, both words being written identically kul’.

13 There can be little doubt that this much debated word (which occurs also in Gbd 12.7–11) should be read in the form given here. Cf. J. Duchesne-Guillemain, *Dr. J. M. Unwala Memorial Volume*, Bombay 1984, p. 14–17.
(3) He made perfect mainly the power with which mēnōg creation is accomplished, and through it (he carried out) the work of creation suitable for that power. He assigned each one of the gods residing in mēnōg to his particular task.

(4) In the power of accomplishing gēlīg creation there was manifest, by the will of the Creator, the marvellous mēnōg of substantial force by the creation of the mēnōg of spiritual force, by association to the finest14 gēlīg self.

(5) First (proceeded) nihang ('a little'), the Avestan name of which is kul,15 called in the language of the world kyš slyšwtk'.16

(6) From nihang, the name of which is also kut, slyšwtk', (proceeded) wahānag ('cause'), the Avestan name of which is 'embryo'17 and 'hollowness';18 it is called in the language of the people 'a trunk'19 (?)-kyš. It is the container20 of kut, and he made kul inside it.

(?) From wahānag, whose name is also xwardaqīh, gibrṭh, sluṇaḥ-kyš, (proceeded) waśn,21 the Avestan name of which is 'having ramifications' (?);22 it is called in the language of the people 'being scattered'. It is a container for wahānag, wahānag was made inside it.

15 This word, which is apparently connected to Avestan kulaka-, 'small', could also be read as the Pahlavi *kōd, like kōdag. The other dēnīq words in this chapter have all Pahlavi forms.
16 I can find no explanation for these words. kiš may be the word for 'circle'.
17 For xwardagīth, which describes a stage in the development of the embryo, cf. GBd 16.4: pas az gūmēnāţh xwardagīth bawēδ, daślag humānāţg, "after the mixture there is the (development of) the embryo, resembling daślag (= 'foetus')". This reading of the word seems to me preferable to Zaehner's āvartakīth (cf. Zoroastrian, p. 305, note to line 173).
18 I.e., the stage in which the hollowed areas in the body are formed. Cf. GBd 16.6.
19 Or 'a column, pillar'. Cf. DkM 242.1: cešōn ka sluṇ i kadag *skanīhēδ, kadag hanbahēδ. "Just as when the pillar of the house is broken, the house collapses".
20 xīg means properly 'a water skin'.
21 waśn could mean 'the male', cf. NPersian guśn. The NPersian word means also, by extension, 'conception', and this meaning might also apply here, although this does not seem the proper place for the concept.
22 The spelling in line 22 of DkM 349 allows the reading wīškōmandīh, or possibly *wīškānēmāndīh. On the word in the form as emended here cf. R. C. Zaehner, BSOS, 9 (1937–39), p. 318.
(8) From waśn, whose name is also 'having ramifications' and 'being scattered', (proceeded) the mēnōg of spiritual force, the associate, the first body, the Avestan name of which is 'the wheel' and 'the sphere'. It is also called 'sphere' in the language of the people. Its offspring are inside (it).

(9) The luminaries: the sun, moon and stars, are the common origin of all the creatures which are underneath them. They control the substances, and are themselves the highest of the substances.

(10) From 'the wheel' (proceeded) hot and moist 'becoming', possessed of wind; for arresting the demons residing in mēnōg, it is, with assembled forces, the begetter of gēliq creations, the seed of seeds.

(11) From 'becoming' (proceeded) the 'movement of becoming', which is the begetters of the product of 'becoming'. It is also called 'the elements'.

(12) From ['the movement of becoming'] (proceeded) 'the stable existence of becoming', which is the living beings which are in it; the entities of cattle and man, which are the gēliq shape of the product.24

23 The verb in the text is in the singular.
24 The text remains largely obscure, but it is hoped that this attempt may have contributed something towards understanding it.

[This article was completed in 1967. Some additions and changes made in the proof stage in 1970 are marked by brackets.]
ONCE UPON A TIME

A study of Yekî Bûd, Yekî Nabûd, the first collection of short stories
by Sayyid Muhâammad 'Ali Jamâl-Zâdeh

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Introductory Note.

The present article is based on a more extensive study of Yekî Bûd, Yekî Nabûd, Once Upon a Time, which is to be the second chapter of a comprehensive biography on the life and works of Sayyid Muhâammad 'Ali Jamâl-Zâdeh, now undertaken by the present author. When completed, the study will be larger in scope than any other existing study in the field of modern Persian literature in both European languages and Persian. The fact remains that at present it is difficult to point to works which are aimed at examining the life and literary endeavors of a single author in modern Persian prose or poetry. The studies thus far have had different aims, but, most of them fall into the category of general surveys—a distinct necessity due to the fact that modern Persian literature is so little known to the European reader and studied seriously so little by literary critics in Persia. Hence, the difference in approach in the present study. Because of the space which the author has made available to himself, it was possible to examine the stories from different points of view while paying special attention to their literary merits.

The literary evaluation is supplemented in this study with a short synopsis of every story and various translated passages for the sake of illustration.

The first chapter of the study, when completed, will consist of a sketch of Jamâl-Zâdeh's life. The other chapters will deal with