'ALI AND MU'AWIYAH
The Rise of the Umayyad Caliphate 656—661.

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I.

Modern critical studies of history have enabled us to prove, point by point, that substantial parts of the immensely rich material handed down by the Islamic chroniclers must be due to subsequent misrepresentations of facts for the purpose of serving passionate political partisanship. It is of particular significance that the historical as well as the legal transmission—irrespective both of the interests served and the means employed—very nearly unanimously condemn the Umayyad Caliphate. Knowledge of this process of misrepresentation has been obtained primarily through systematic studies of the Ḥadīth-literature, but it has been met with again in historiography, the origin of which is common with that of the legal tradition. The mere fact that

1 Cf. e. g. Th. Noeldeke in ZDMG, vol. L II (1898), 16 ff.; Wellhausen, passim.; Lammens, passim.

Besides the abbreviations generally used, the following will be found here:
Bat. = al-Balāghūrī: Kitāb Ansāb al-Āṣrāf.
Caetani = Annali dell' Islam, compilati da Leone Caetani, I—X (Milano 1905—26).
Lammens = H. Lammens: Études sur le règne du calife omajjade Mo'āwiya Ier (Beyrouth 1908).
Mad. = al-Madā'ī.
Sal. = Šālīḥ b. Kaysān,
Wellhausen = J. Wellhausen: The Arab Kingdom and its Fall (Calcutta 1927).
Wellhausen: Pro. = J. Wellhausen: Prolegomena zur ältesten Geschichte Islams. (Skitzen und Vorarbeiten VI. (Berlin 1899), 1—186).
the defeated Meccan aristocracy under Umayyad leadership made its way on to the foremost place in Islam during the first generation after 632 should indeed suffice to provoke our scepticism as to the jurists' and historians' highly coloured picture of the Syrian Caliphate.

From the Ḥadīṭ-literature we know that this ill will reflects, inter alia, the reaction to the Umayyad disregard of all other legitimate claims to suzerainty, both those of the Prophet's family—represented by 'Ali—and those of the Medinese 'helpers' (Anṣār) and the Meccan emigrants (Muhāgirūn). The fact is that these groups gradually developed an increasingly clear antagonism under the earliest caliphs until it culminated in open conflict at the murder of Uṭmān in 656. However, it was Muhammad himself who, through the balance-of-power politics pursued during the last years of his life, had laid the foundation for the formation of parties, and although these parties are still far from being uniform, they had no doubt existed already in 632. In any case, Abū Bekr's, 'Umar's and, to some extent, Uṭmān's caliphs should be regarded rather as the exponent of emigrant circles, but can, however, hardly be interpreted as an enduring animosity to the Medinans or 'Ali. No such state of things is definitely ascertained in our sources. As far as the Meccan patriciate is concerned, the situation looks somewhat different. It could hardly in the long run resign itself to a subordinate position within the Muhammadan community; its prestige was indeed such that Muhammad himself had to buy its loyalty despite opposition from his own associates.

It is not surprising, therefore, that also Abū Bekr had to adopt an accommodating attitude to the Meccans. It is certainly quite interesting to observe that although Abū 'Ubayda operates on behalf of the Caliph in the Byzantine Mediterranean provinces, of which he subsequently becomes governor, he leaves, at the suggestion of 'Umar, the military leadership of the conquest of

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1 F. Buhl: Muhammeds Liv (Copenhagen 1903), 305 ff.
3 Buhl: Muhammeds Liv, 310, 313.
Syria to Yazid b. Abi Sufyān. Upon the death of Abū 'Ubayda, Yazid became himself governor of Syria, and his brother Mu'āwiyyah b. Abi Sufyān took over the command in ḡund Dimašq. This arrangement would suggest that the Umayyads had special interests to safeguard in these areas, interests to which the Caliph has felt obliged to submit. This point of view is borne out by the family's well-established leadership of the Meccan merchant aristocracy and its co-operation with former Byzantine officials during the establishment of the Arabic financial administration at Damascus. The definitive consolidation of the Umayyad position in Syria naturally took place in 637 when 'Umar, upon the death of Yazid, appointed Mu'āwiyyah governor. There is thus every indication that the Umayyads through their family's and the "Syrian" Arab tribes' bonds of attachment to that area as well as through contact with the Byzantine rulers established a unique position here. And the weight of this position becomes no less obvious on remembering that Syria since late Antiquity had been the economic centre of the Mediterranean region; with all its resources it constitutes a safe background for the strength of the Umayyads.

Right up to the Caliph election in 644 the emigrants had been leaders in the country, but during 'Uṭmān's Caliphate they were being thrust into the background by the Umayyads. The Caliph himself was, to be sure, an emigrant, but he was also an Umayyad and consequently attended—or had to attend—to his family's interests before those of anybody else. He did it especially by placing members of his family in key positions as governors of the provinces, a procedure that was destined to evoke the latent discord, and in which connection the general indignation against the Meccan aristocracy, the incarnation of ḡā hilfiyyah,

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1 Tab. I. 2079; b. Sa'd, 4:1.70.
2 Caetani IV. 29 ff., 38 ff.
3 Wellhausen, 134 ff.; Lammens 237, 384 ff.; *idem: La Syrie, Précis historique* I (Beyrouth 1921), 70; Caetani V, 438 ff.; *cf. Historisk Tidsskrift, 11th series, vol. V (1956), 153.—The settling of ḇāsānids in Syria is of course also instrumental in bringing about the transition.—It is of interest that Chronicon Maronitium notes that Mu'āwiyyah—although in vain—attempted to strike his own Arabian coinage. (ZDMG, vol. XXIX (1875), 96).
4 Caetani IV, 153 ff.
has presumably played an important part. These feelings were, however, linked with the Anšar’s and emigrants’ resentment at becoming the victims of Umayyad family interests. Among the dissatisfied elements may be noted prominent people like the Prophet’s cousin, al-Zubayr, the wealthy Ṭalḥah, ʿĀliyah and ʿAmr b. ʿAṣ. The latter had been removed by ʿUṯmān from the governorship in Egypt which happened to be one of the hotbeds of the unrest. Finally, ʿUṯmān’s fiscal policy during the expansion in al-Sawad appears to have brought the Arabian (especially the Kalbite) tribes in Iraq into opposition under the leadership of Malik al-Āṣṭar at Kufah.

All these groups participated in the agitation against the new régime, even though their individual parts in the murder of ʿUṯmān in June 656 are of course difficult to ascertain. In any case, the Anšar seem to have been especially engaged, and it was also they and al-Āṣṭar who immediately after the murder forced through the election of ʿAlī for Caliph—in al-Madāʾīnī’s words: “in conflict with Qurayš and Umayyah.”

The Caliph murder carried the antagonism, which had long been in ferment, into open conflict, a schism, a fitnah that was clearly in contravention of the fundamental principles of Islam. ʿAlī’s election was therefore, directly and indirectly, somewhat problematical. He had, to be sure, no personal part in the murder, but the circles that had carried him into power were involved, and made it eo ipso necessary for him to define his attitude to the conflict. The apparent consequence of the Caliph election turned out to be that ʿAlī had to join forces with the Anšar and al-Āṣṭar. His most conspicuous action immediately after having taken up his functions is that of replacing most of ʿUṯmān’s governors with Anšar or men from his own circle. It is likewise very noticeable that all through ʿAlī’s caliphate al-Āṣṭar was

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1 Cf. Buhl, 12 note 2.
2 Mad. (Agh. XI. 29—30; Caetani VIII, 85 ff.); Mas. IV, 202 ff.—As to al-Āṣṭar, see b. Saʿd VI. 148. (Caetani IX, 602 ff.) and C. Huard s. v. Malik al-Āṣṭar in E. J. vol. I, 504.
3 Cf. b. Saʿd III. I. 49—50. (Caetani VIII, 165 f.)
4 Mad. (Tab. I, 3069—70); cf. b. Saʿd III. I. 20 (Caetani VIII, 325 f., IX, 50).
5 Wellhausen, Pro., 136, 144 f.
keeping close to him and was continually being entrusted with important military and administrative tasks. Mu'āwiyah is hardly entirely mistaken when, at a later stage, he characterizes al-Ashtar as one of his chief adversaries. On the other hand, 'Ali could count on no sympathy either from the Umayyads, who would lay claim to blood vengeance and now found themselves cut off suddenly from all influence, or from the emigrants generally. It is true that so far 'Ali does not appear to have assailed Mu'āwiyah's governorship although most of the other governors had been removed, while on his side Mu'āwiyah refrained both from intervening in the movement against 'Uthmān and from participating in the first rebellion against 'Ali. On both sides, political as well as defensive considerations may have entered in the picture, but that is an inference which we are unable to substantiate. The Meccans, however, under the leadership of 'Abdallāh b. al-Walid b. 'Abd al-'Uzza, who was closely associated with the Umayyads, refused to recognize Ali.

The discontent with 'Ali was for the time being concentrated around Medina where the general sentiment soon veered round in favour of 'Uthmān. Religious scruples about the Caliph murder and a political reaction were crystallized in a—again by no means uniform—party, al-'Uthmāniyyah, which soon became the rallying point of the essential oppositional interests, comprising also those outside the Umayyads' intimate circle. A few Anšār especially from 'Uthmān's following joined the party whilst, most significantly, 'Alīyah, al-Zubayr and 'Āšāh—somewhat paradoxically—ranged themselves solidly behind the movement because its sting was presently to be aimed at 'Ali.

Thus the Caliph was made the scapegoat for the fitnah, the fact notwithstanding that he had taken no personal part in the Caliph murder and could, of course, prove his direct innocence, but all in vain. The 'Uthmānites maintained that the responsibility indirectly lay with 'Ali because he had done nothing to save the

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1 Taḥ. I. 3394. (Caetani IX, 504); cf. infra p. 196.

2 As to Mu'āwiyah, see infra pp. 179f and Lammens, 231; Caetani X, 266—69.

3 Sal. (Bał. 467 v; Caetani IX, 18). This information is kept back by all later chroniclers, but is confirmed in that the Meccans gave their support to 'Āšāh.

4 For the same. Lammens, 109 ff.; Buhl, 36 f.; Caetani IX, 72 ff., 216 ff.
distressed Caliph although he was staying in Medina during the critical period. The significance of this accusation is presumably to be found above all in that it obtained a natural background from 'Ali's political co-operation with those circles that were behind the action against 'Uthmān. It is no doubt symptomatic that the murdered Caliph's court-poet, Ḥassān b. Ṭābit, directs the demand for blood vengeance, first towards the Anṣār and, secondly, towards 'Ali for his defection. Specific grounds for the accusation were, however, non-existing until 'Ali ipso facto had to give refuge to the murderers, and refused to hand them over to the victim's relatives. It is moreover strange to observe how prominent a position one of the killers, 'Ammār b. Yāsir, occupied at 'Ali's court. We have thus reached the stage where the most prominent emigrants, a number of the Anṣār and Umayyads—apart, however, from Muʿāwiyyah—rose in rebellion against 'Ali, al-Aṣfar and the majority of the Anṣār.

Our purpose does not require any detailed study of the course of the immediately following events. Already in December 656 'Ali and al-Aṣfar defeated the Uṯmānītes decisively in the battle of the Camel. It is, however, of great significance that the sanguinary clash deepened the fitnah by bringing about the second of these turbulent years' religio-political parties, al-Muʿāzīla, the Neutralism. According to the latter's conception, it did not fall to the believers to place the responsibility for the fitnah; conversely, he who by force of arms arrogated to himself any right incurred a heavy responsibility for the disintegration of the ummah, i. e., in this particular case, 'Ali. On the other hand, the Muʿāzīlites dared neither make the Caliph an immediate party to 'Uṯmān's death, nor compromise themselves by associating with him. They would—as the party designation indicates—avoid any participation in the fitnah and remain neutral, and they reacted sharply to the

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1 Cf. Buhl, 30 ff., 40.
2 Mas. IV, 284 I.; Iqd. II, 188.
3 Caetani IX, 575—600.—Later, during the outpost skirmishes before the battle at Ṣifīn, the Syriac leader, Abū-l-Aʿwār al Sulami, refused to fight a duel with al-Aṣfar because the latter's complacency in 'Uṯmān's death made him unworthy. (Tab. I. 3203—04; Caetani IX, 271).
4 Cf. Buhl, 40—53.
battle of the Camel\textsuperscript{1}. The governor in Kufah, Abū Mūsā al-
Aṣ'ari, who belonged to this wing, refused the Caliph admittance to the
town so that ʿAli, with al-
Aṣ'ar as intermediary, had to negotiate
an agreement with him before he could go from Basrah to Kufah.
al-
Aṣ'ar seems to have advised the Caliph to suppress the Muʿta-
Zilism by force. Although ʿAli rejected this, Abū Mūsā was soon
removed from his post, a measure that nevertheless failed to
bring the unrest in the Eastern provinces to an end\textsuperscript{2}.

Nor had al-
Uṯmāniyya been wiped out by the battle of the
Camel. The movement had spread to Egypt and Iraq where it
now found a stronghold in the regions bordering on Syria, in
Raqqah and Mosul\textsuperscript{3}. Everything now depended upon the new
Caliph's relations with Syria where the Umayyads' most pro-
minent figure resided.

II.

It was, as we know, the publication of al-
Ṭabarī's (d. 923) Annales with their wealth of details that blazed the trail for mo-
dern critical studies, headed by Wellhausen. It now became
possible to rid the historical tradition of many arbitrary ex-
crescences in consequence of the knowledge obtained of the
primary individual traditions underlying the later distortions.
The critical difficulties are not, however, solved by disallowing
the later chroniclers as authoritative sources\textsuperscript{4}. For one thing,
none of the narrative sources is separated by less than two or
three generations from the events; for another, the scope of the
critical results is limited by the one-sidedness in Ṭabarī's selection
of his sources insofar as he keeps—no doubt deliberately—al-
most exclusively to the orthodox Iraqi tradition. The more wel-
come, therefore, is Balāḏūrī (d. 892), who—in contradistinction

\begin{itemize}
\item[1] Lammens 116 ff.
\item[2] Buhl, 46 ff.
\item[3] Infra, p. 181.
\item[4] I have made the later chroniclers the subject of special studies, but without
positive results: In all essentials they draw on the early Abbasid period's compendia
without on any important point having had access to sources that we do not
now know in a purer form. The growth of the tradition is, however, of considerable
interest, and I hope to have occasion at a later stage to account for it systematically.
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to Ṭabarî and other compilers—does not suppress divergent versions about the same events. Even though his precision is often inferior to Ṭabarî’s, his Kitâb Ansâb al-Âshrâf does provide us with an opportunity of comparing the narratives by his Medinese informants with the well-known Kufic ones.

On the whole, it thus becomes necessary to take into account three main versions, one Medinese by Šâliḥ b. Kaysân (d. 758) and two Kufic ones, by ‘Awânah (d. 764) and Abû Miḥnaf (d. 774) respectively. Whereas the first one is due exclusively to Balâduri’s rendering, the latter two are somewhat more difficult to determine because the transmission is not always ascertainable.

(1). Šâliḥ b. Kaysân tells that immediately after his election, ‘Ali promised Mu‘âwiyyah his friendship if he would but swear allegiance (bay‘ah) to him. Mu‘âwiyyah dispatched his own messenger to Medina with his written reply, which besides the usual introductory formula carried only the address: “To ‘Ali b. Abî Ṭâlib from Mu‘âwiyyah b. Abî Sufyân”, and thus denied ‘Ali the title of Caliph. When Ali received the refusal, the bearer exclaimed “Oh, Qurayš tribe. The horsemen, the horsemen. By God, there (Medina) we shall be upon you with 40,000 horsemen!”

On being informed of the battle of the Camel, Mu‘âwiyyah urged the Syrians to fight for the vengeance claim and to set up an election conclave (šûrâ) to appoint a new Caliph. He received oath of allegiance as Amûr, not as Caliph. “So passed six months or more after the murder of ‘Uṯmân”, whereupon ‘Ali started moving, and the two parties met at Ṣiffîn. The armies were facing each other for some time, but when the battle had got under way and had lasted for two days, the Syrians began

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1 Despite the stated year of printing, Buhl’s work on ‘Ali seems to have been finished about 1912, for he does not quote from any later literature. Buhl not, therefore, defined his attitude to Balâduri although della Vida’s summary in RSO VI was available in 1921; Buhl refers but once to de Goeje’s concise account in ZDMG, vol. XXXVIII, 382 ff. Further about Balâduri, de Goeje 1. c. and della Vida’s treatment in RSO VI, 427 ff.

2 Bal. 467 v—68 v. (Caetani IX, 18—20). The messenger’s exclamation refers presumably to the massacre organized by the Umâyyads at Medina in 683, cf. infra pp. 170 ff.

3 Bal. 504 v. (Caetani IX, 289).
to give ground. Then a Syrian, b. Lahfiyah by name, rode forward with a copy of the Quran between the ears of his horse, and others followed his example. A cleavage arose in 'Ali's camp and he agreed to "having the Quran decide the dispute between the two parties". It was proposed to choose two Anšar for arbitrators, but the Syrians, who doubted their objectiveness, would not agree to this. Instead, 'Amr b. al-'Aṣ and Abū Mūsā al-Aš'ari were appointed, and an arbitration document with the conditions was drawn up.

(2). 'Awnānah tells that upon his arrival at Kufah from Basrah, 'Ali summoned the governor in Hamadān, Ġarīr b. ʿAbdallāh al-Baḡali, who offered to go to Syria in order to demand bayʿah from Muṭawiyyah in the hope that by virtue of his kinship with him—he was a Yamānī—he would have the best possible chances of reaching a favourable result in Damascus. al-Aṣṭar, suspecting Ġarīr of being in league with Muṭawiyyah, warned against this procedure, but 'Ali decided nevertheless to make the attempt. In his request Ġarīr draws Muṭawiyyah's attention to the fact that both Anšar and emigrants had recognized 'Ali, and that he must do likewise. But Muṭawiyyah, while putting Ġarīr off, sent for 'Amr who had stayed away from the fīnah, but now, on being promised Egypt, entered into an agreement with the Syrian governor. He advised Muṭawiyyah to agitate in Syria for 'Ali's complicity in the murder of the Caliph, and Muṭawiyyah fell in with the idea. When Ġarīr returned to report

1 Bal. 515 v—16 v. (Caetani IX, 489 f.). Şāliḥ's tradition is found again in az-Zuhri (d. 743) only, and already then in a retouched form. (Ibid. 498 r, 514 v—15 r; della Vida, 453, Caetani IX, 488 f.), and in the Arabic version by Abū I-Faraḍ (Bar Hebraeus, d. 1286) interpolated in other traditions (Historia compendiosa Dynastorum... arabe edita et latine versa ab E. Pococke (Oxf. 1663), 188 f. (versio pp. 119 f.).

2 Tab. I, 325—55. (Caetani IX, 233); cf. ʿIsa b. Yazid b. Daʿūd (Bal. 498 r—99 r) = Yaʿqūb II, 214—17 (Caetani IX, 239 f.), whence it appears that Ġarīr refers to the kinship as justification for his offer; cf. also Mubarrad (Bal. 500 r)); Bal. 494 r—v. (without Ṣnād); Dim. 166 f. (Caetani IX, 255 f., 253, and 243 f.), and Mas. IV, 338.

3 Tab. I, 3255 (Caetani IX, 233); cf. ʿIsa b. Yazid, l.c. (where, however, it is Muṭawiyyah offering 'Amr Egypt in order to overcome his qualms); Mubarrad, l.c., and Mas. IV, 298, 338 f.
to the Califh, al-Âṣṭar reminded the latter of his warning. Ġârîr
retorted that if al-Âṣṭar had gone, he would have been lynched
by the Syrians who counted him among the murderers. Ġârîr
then resignedly retired to Qarqisîyâ. ‘Ali meditated revenge by
way of burning his house, but desisted\(^1\).

‘Awânah ends up with a number of details concerning ‘Ali’s
administrative and military preparations for the campaign
against Syria, such as the summoning of governors, assign-
ments of military commands and, at last, ‘Ali’s departure from
Kufah\(^2\).

(3). Abû Miḥnaφ\(^3\). After the murder of the Califh, the Taqifît
Muṣîrâh b. Šu‘bah recommended to ‘Ali that Muʿâwiyyah keep
his governorship as he might otherwise be expected to raise
claim for revenge. However, this advice was, at the suggestion
of ‘Abdallâh b. ‘Abbâs, rejected\(^4\). ‘Uṭmân’s wife Nâ’îlah then
forwards the murdered Califh’s blood-stained shirt to Muʿâwiyyah
together with an account of the events at Medina in which ‘Ali
is made responsible for the murder because he left ‘Uṭmân in
the lurch. The Syrians became so furious that they vowed chastity
until the murder had been avenged\(^5\).

‘Ali then informs Muʿâwiyyah that ‘Uṭmân was killed without
his knowledge and demands his bay’tah. “He wrote nothing
about the governorship (or according to others: he allowed him
to keep it)”\(^6\). Muʿâwiyyah’s written reply is here identical with
Šâlîh b. Kaysân’s rendering. The bearer justified orally the
refusal in that the Syrians are of the opinion that ‘Ali is respon-

\(^1\) Tab. I. 3255—56; Bal. 494 r—v; cf. Din. 171 (Caetani IX, 234, 253, 247 f.)
and Mas. IV, 339—41.

\(^2\) Bal. 504 v—05 r; Tab. I. 3250 (Caetani IX, 289 f., 266); cf. Bal. 501 v—02 r
(without isnâd; Ibid. IX, 284).

\(^3\) In his case the correct sequence of the individual accounts found scattered
in Balâdûrî, Ṭabarî and Abû-l-Farağ al-İråhânî creates a factor of uncer-
tainty of some importance. The elements are here placed in the sequence given
by Wâṣîlî (Tab. I. 3083—85) and Dinawari, 149 f. (Caetani VIII, 338 f., IX,
13 f.; cf. Mas. IV, 296 f.) because they both draw on Abû Miḥnaφ or some related
source.

\(^4\) Bal. 406 v. (Caetani VIII, 330).

\(^5\) Agh. XV, 71—72. (Caetani VIII, 305 f.); cf. Bal. 501 r. (without isnâd; Ibid.
IX, 255), and Mas. IV, 297.
sible for ‘Uṭmān’s blood and are determined on revenge, to which ‘Ali exclaims: “Oh, Medinans, you shall find to your cost who will be beaten”\(^1\).

There is now a hiatus in Abū Mīḥnaf until the rupture between the two parties. He then reports a copious exchange of notes in which Mu‘āwiya puts forward his claims for vengeance and for the setting up of a šūrā to elect a new Caliph; he censures ‘Ali for his ambiguous attitude to the earlier Caliphs. ‘Ali defends himself by referring to his services to Islam\(^2\). Next, Abū Mīḥnaf gives an account, analogous with—though more circumstantial than—that of ‘Awānah, of ‘Ali’s preparations for the combat, of the consultations in his camp, and of the march toward Raqqah, where, however, only al-Āṣar’s threats can induce the pro-

‘Uṭmānīte population to throw a bridge across the Euphrates. The army crosses the river under the supreme command of al-

Āṣar, but after a few skirmishes with Mu‘āwiya’s vanguard they effect a minor, provisional retreat. The Syrians occupy the watering place on the Euphrates to which they deny ‘Ali’s troops access until al-Āṣar seizes the place by force. ‘Ali, however, permits Mu‘āwiya’s troops to fetch water without hindrance\(^3\).

‘Ali pitched camp at Ṣillīn, opposite Raqqah, at the end of Dhū-l-Ḥijjah (a. H. 36) whereafter the armies were for some time facing each other until the battle commenced on the 8th Ṣafar (a. H. 37). ‘Amr then intervened for the purpose of creating a cleavage in ‘Ali’s camp by fixing copies of the Quran to the warriors’ lances as an appeal to let God’s words decide the conflict. The Caliph has to yield, especially because of the pious Quran readers’ insistence, and it is then agreed to appoint two umpires. The Syrians choose ‘Amr whilst ‘Ali’s troops, his protests notwithstanding, thrust Abū Mūsā upon him; ‘Ali’s own choice would have been ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Abbās or al-Āṣar. The Syrians, however, refuse to sign the agreement until ‘Ali in consequence of ‘Amr’s protest and his followers’ entreaties

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\(^1\) Bal. 467 v—68 r. (Caetani IX, 19). ‘Ali’s exclamation refers to the massacre at Medina 683; see infra pp. 170 f.

\(^2\) Bal. 494 v—97 r; account in Din., 172—74. (Caetani IX, 253 f., 248 f.).

\(^3\) Bal. 561 v—94 v; Tab. I. 3259—72; cf. Din., 174—82. (Caetani IX, 284—88, 267—77, 277—84).
relinquishes his official title of Caliph. The two umpires, each accompanied by 400 men, were to meet at the oasis of Dūmat al-Ǧandal in Ramadān and decide the dispute according to the Quran and the Prophet’s sunna.

The immediate impression from these three versions is somewhat confusing. They have likenesses so striking as to reveal a connection between them, but at the same time noticeable divergences. The interrelationship between the two Kufic sources appears to be the least complicated. True, our knowledge of them is only fragmentary, and in most cases they fill in each other’s lacunae chronologically, but where they coincide, they are entirely identical. This applies in particular to their circumstantial account of ‘Ali’s preparations before his campaign against Syria and their motivations of the details. It is, moreover, significant that ‘Awānah and Abū Miḥnaf are in common as regards their anti-Umayyad attitude. In both it is ‘Amr b. al-‘Aṣ who makes the final decisions—not Muʿāwiya, who is somewhat easily swayed by his entourage. ‘Awānah makes for instance ‘Amr take the initiative in the agitation in Syria; in Abū Miḥnaf it is likewise he who directs the fighting on the Syrian side and later conceives the idea of suspending the battle by appealing to the Quran for settlement. Both have evidently attached great importance to establishing a contrast between, on the one hand, the effects of Muʿāwiya’s passivity (“ḥilm”) and lacking competence, and, on the other, the ideals of Islamic chivalry (the futuwa-concept) as represented by ‘Ali. Both the idea and the purpose underlying this contra-positioning will be dealt with later on; here it will suffice to state that in these two chroniclers, and still more in the later ones, they are undoubtedly due to a deliberate construction and have in this connection hardly more than a historiographic interest. As regards ‘Ali, we know for certain that the mentioned qualities are not ascribed to him before the advent of the Abbassid traditionists and are without any foundation in

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reality. For the present, then, we note that the common features definitely indicate that ‘Awānah and Abū Miḥnaf represent a kindred, and perhaps identical, Kufic tradition. The question thus arises whether the divergences are sufficiently pronounced for us to disallow this interpretation.

The main difference between ‘Awānah and Abū Miḥnaf consists in the latter’s giving the time of Mu‘awiyyah’s breach with ‘Ali as the summer of 656, immediately after ‘Uṭmān’s death, whereas in ‘Awānah the breach does not occur until after the battle of the Camel. As far as we can judge, Abū Miḥnaf replaces Ġāfir b. ‘Abdallāh’s mission to Damascus with the voluminous exchange of notes. Here, too, we find manifestation of a tendentious disposition. The reproaches against ‘Ali for joint responsibility in the murder of the Caliph and the desire for a sūrā are here inserted into a veritable indictment against the Caliph with the latter’s replication. Mu‘awiyyah upbraids ‘Ali for his ill-will against the earlier Caliphs, more especially against ‘Uṭmān. ‘Ali, on his part, adduces his services to Islam, the sufferings and struggles he had incurred for the sake of the Prophet, adding that already in 632 the Caliphate had been offered him by Abū Sufyān, and that he had declined this dignity for fear of the consequences of allying himself with “people that had hardly estranged themselves from ġāhiliyyah”. The whole import of this passage is hardly of any relevance as regards the conflict itself. The legitimate privileges of the Prophet’s descendants above those of the Umayyads are so manifest to Abū Miḥnaf that he confines himself to the sarcastic identification of the Meccan patrician leader with ġāhiliyyah, the most arrant paganism. The

1 Noeldeke, op. cit., 28 ff.; W. Sarasin: Das Bild Aliis bei den Historikern der Sunna (Diss., Basel 1907), passim; Buhl, passim. Characteristically, the chroniclers do not place al-Asfār in any corresponding relation to ‘Ali, although the elements certainly are there. See also Lammens’ remark, op. cit. pp. 140 f.

2 The fact that the later sources, Dhīnawī, Ya‘qūbī, and to some extent Mas‘ūdī, recount both ‘Awānah and Abū Miḥnaf continuously does not constitute any sure criterion that these two represent the same circle of traditions. Any such argumentation must assume that not all the three later authors draw on common sources that had already combined the two earlier historians, and we have no proof of that being the case.

12 Acta Orientalia, XXIII
salient point applies to the placing of ‘Ali in relation to the orthodox Caliphs and his martyrdom for Islam. As here combined with the ‘Uṯmānītic accusations against him, they reveal historiographic elements that belong rather to the late Umayyad or the early Abbasid period, in any case a time when the orthodox chroniclers tried to prove that the Prophet’s descendants had greater claims to the Caliphate than any other group. Apart from Mu‘āwiya’s fundamental standpoint we dare, therefore, have no real confidence in this exchange of notes.

The discrepancy between Abū Miḥnaf and ‘Awānah is not, however, exhausted by any disallowance of these diplomatic documents, nor is it explained by the fact that Mu‘āwiya’s attitude must in any case lead to a rupture, whatever the date. Abū Miḥnaf emphasizes very strongly that the breach occurs immediately after the murder of the Caliph; Mu‘āwiya straightaway flies into a passion although ‘Ali has no intention whatever of deposing him; the Syrian agitation for vengeance is being launched already then, i.e. simultaneously with Taḥlah’s and al-Zubayr’s rebellion. This dating of the breach can, by no means, be reconciled with the fact that Abū Miḥnaf has, in the same breath, told of ‘Ali’s determination to make Mu‘āwiya suffer the same fate as the other governors. Nor does the oracular comment to Mu‘āwiya’s rejection, which he attributes to ‘Ali, carry any immediate conviction. It alludes—as touched upon by Caetani—presumably to the massacre at Medina after the

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1 Noeldeke, *op. cit.*, 16 ff.; Sarasin, *op. cit.*, 10 ff., 25 ff., 61 ff. It is curious that the semi-Shiite Dhunawari (172 ff.) again takes the sting out of the indictment of ‘Ali.

2 Having recognized this contradiction and the discrepancy between Abū Miḥnaf and ‘Awānah, the later tradition—for instance Sayf b. ʿUmar—endeavours by various means to harmonize. Sayf, for one thing, postpones the tale of ‘Uṯmān’s shirt in order to link it up with ʿAmr’s appeal for agitation in Syria after Ġarir’s mission; for another, he has (unlike Abū Miḥnaf) ‘Ali depose Mu‘āwiya together with all the other governors. However, Mu‘āwiya turns away ‘Ali’s newly appointed successor (Ṣahl b. Ḥunayf) on the Syrian border (*cf. infra* p. 174, n. 3.). In Ṭabarī, who includes all three versions by ‘Awānah, Abū Miḥnaf and Sayf, the result has become very confusing indeed. The retouching in Sayf must have been for the sole purpose of proving ‘Ali’s legitimacy; *cf. also Din.,* 149 ff. and Yaʿq. II, 208—09.
Umayyads’ victory at al-Ḥarr in 683. This anecdote presupposes knowledge of the second civil war. The prophecy must logically be due to a late construction, but even so it does not by itself shake the heart of the matter in Abū Miḥnaf: that the rupture occurs in the summer of 656.

We get no explanation of the discrepancy between Abū Miḥnaf and ʿAwānah until the two Kufic sources are compared with Ṣāliḥ b. Kaysān. By comparison it then becomes obvious that the latter does not refer at all to ʿAmr’s achievements, which the Kufic tradition stresses so strongly; he mentions neither Ǧarir’s mission nor Muʿāwiyah’s contract with ʿAmr; and the Quran proposal, which suspends the battle at Ǧīfīn, is attributed to some otherwise entirely unknown person. On the other hand, Ṣāliḥ emphasizes that immediately after his election ʿAli offered Muʿāwiyah his friendship, which the latter does, to be sure, reject, but it was not until after the battle of the Camel that the Syrian governor took the field against him.

Ṣāliḥ’s account thus differs from the Kufic tradition already by its pro-Umayyad keynote⁴, but has nevertheless also obvious features in common with it. He repeats Muʿāwiyah’s rejection of ʿAli’s approach almost verbatim from Abū Miḥnaf, only that here it is Muʿāwiyah’s messenger that acts as prophet. The two chroniclers have, moreover, some details in common concerning both ʿAli’s war preparations and the fight. The likenesses, however, seem to be more deeply rooted. Ṣāliḥ’s failure, for instance, to mention ʿAmr can hardly be accidental, and in order to make any sense at all the point must be that in this way Ṣāliḥ dissociates himself from the Kufic tradition. The statement as regards the two armies’ facing each other for some time may likewise be due to Kufic influence. Even though the chronicler is referring to a good old Bedouin custom, his observation does not appear in either of the other versions of this tradition, az-Zuhri’s or Abū-l-Faraq’s. Finally, Ṣāliḥ’s chronology carries some faint traces of being influenced by the other side, for after his remark that Muʿāwiyah set up his demands and commenced his pro-

¹ One exception is a note about the battle at Ǧīfīn according to which ʿAli rejects surprise attacks or killing of the wounded, indubitably an old feature.
paganda when news of the battle of the Camel had been received, Šāliḥ states “Thus passed six months or more after the murder of ‘Uṭmān’. This carries us forward to January 657, at the earliest, i.e., immediately after the battle of the Camel in the preceding month. This vague chronological determination may be due to a simple but clumsy construction, and it probably rests on a knowledge of Abū Miṣnaf, for it, too, does not appear in az-Zuhri and Abū-l-Farağ.

There is thus a strong case for thinking that Šāliḥ b. Kaysān has known the Kufic tradition and, conversely, that Abū Miṣnaf has been in touch with the ideas represented by Šāliḥ. This contact is, moreover, of such a character that the explanation to which it most readily lends itself appears to be a controversial discussion. Unlike ‘Awānah, Šāliḥ b. Kaysān emphasizes that although Mu‘āwiyyah took sides immediately after the murder of ‘Uṭmān, at which time ‘Ali tacitly had to yield to him, he did not advance his demand for vengeance or offer active resistance until knowledge of the battle of the Camel had been received. The chronology corresponds exactly with this pattern. The outcome of it all must be that Mu‘āwiyyah had no part whatever in the ‘Uṭmānīite rebellion, and ‘Amr no hand in Mu‘āwiyyah’s dispositions. Again, it is presumably this conception to which Abū Miṣnaf raises objections. He chooses for his starting point Mu‘āwiyyah’s instantaneous breach with ‘Ali, which Šāliḥ, too, accepts. But in contrast with the latter, he maintains that it was in this connection Mu‘āwiyyah’s demand for vengeance was raised; by means of ‘Uṭmān’s shirt (qamīṣ), he now demonstrates that feelings in Syria were already at that time running high. On the other hand, Abū Miṣnaf must forgo Ġarīr’s mission—and thus runs counter to ‘Awānah—but he makes up for it with the very circumstantial exchange of notes which, apart from Mu‘āwiyyah’s fundamental standpoint, must presumably be attributed to his own pen, or that of his source.

This interpretation is confirmed through such anachronisms as we have noted occasionally both in Abū Miṣnaf and Šāliḥ b. Kaysān. The prophecy of the massacre in Medina in 683, the historiographical constructions in the correspondence and also, undoubtedly, the reiterated pleadings to “submit to God’s book
and the Prophet's sunna"1 belong to this category. Conversely, these late impingements provide a clue enabling us to fix the time for the framing of these traditions as the late Umayyad period. Thus, both the Medinese and the Kufic traditions reflect the state of conflict between the Syrian Caliphate and the opposition in the eastern provinces. The controversy furnishes clear evidence that the traditionists took more than an antiquarian interest in the events of 656–61. It is all simply a question of the Umayyads' title to the Caliphate, which is challenged by Abū Mīhnaf but defended by Šāliḥ b. Kaysān.

Provided that this interpretation is tenable, it becomes indeed very interesting to observe how the historiographic propaganda coincides chronologically with the formation of the earliest Medinese and Kufic legal doctrines, and does in its way quite correspond to the nature of Islamic historical writing. The opposition's repudiation of the Umayyad Caliphate's achievements and legitimacy is responded to with counter-traditions. Both Šāliḥ b. Kaysān and, especially, az-Zuhri were Medinese traditionists of good repute; both had been in personal contact with the court in Damascus, and we know for certain that despite his high standing az-Zuhri as spokesman for the Syrian rulers had no hesitation in fabricating false traditions. The historic pragmatism, demonstrated by Wellhausen in Sayf b. 'Umar (about 800) or, rather, in his sources, may thus be traced back a generation or two to the beginning of the eighth century, or still earlier.

In the above we have mentioned the chronicles as the three traditionists' own products, but that is, however, only partially true. It would undoubtedly be more correct to deal with them as representatives of a particular circle of traditions. True, Šāliḥ b. Kaysān and az-Zuhri are so early that they themselves

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1 For instance, Abū Mīhnaf records that while on his way to Šīrāz 'Ali urges Mu'āwiyyah to resign himself "to God's book and the Prophet's sunna". (Bal. 502 v–64 v; Tab. I. 3370; Caetani IX, 286 f., 274 f.).—In Zuhri and Abū Mīhnaf the arbitrators shall pass judgment in accordance with "God's book and the general—not the special—sunna". (Bal. 515 r.; Tab. I. 3330; Caetani IX, 479, 489).

must have been parties to the common polemics while they were still topical, i.e. presumably during Hišām’s Caliphate (724–43). By comparison, the two Kufic chroniclers belong to a somewhat younger generation, the early Abbassid period, but the concept of which they are exponents goes further back. Abū Miḥnaf quotes authorities that like Ṣāliḥ and az-Zuhri belong to the late Umayyad period⁴, and ‘Awānah’s account is met with again, in a corrupted state, in the Shi‘ī Kufic traditionist ‘Īsā b. Yazīd b. Da‘b al-Kīnāni about, or shortly before, 700².

If we, then, eliminate the obvious distortions of the transmission, there still remains a core to be considered. It is significant that Ṣāliḥ b. Kaysān and ‘Awānah agree on the point that the definitive rupture between the two parties did not occur until after the battle of the Camel—only then does Mu‘āwiya raise the demand of vengeance and commence the agitation in Syria. On the other side remains Abū Miḥnaf’s assertion that the Syrian governor rejected ‘Ali’s request for ḥay‘ah in the summer of 656, a statement that is, admittedly, fitted into an apocryphal, anecdotal form, but cannot by that fact alone be subject to an a priori rejection. It is by no means evident—nor can it be formally ruled out, though—that ‘Ali for factual or prestigious reasons should have addressed the same appeal to Mu‘āwiya a second time, not even with the outcome of the battle of the Camel in mind.

It is noteworthy that according to ‘Awānah’s version ‘Ali instructed Garīr b. ‘Abdallāh to demand no more than ḥay‘ah of Mu‘āwiya, “which”, adds the author somewhat disingenuously, “Mahāḡirāh and Anṣār had already paid him”. We hear nothing, however, of Mu‘āwiya’s governorship, which, incidentally, is mentioned in none of the other early sources—Wāqidî or b. Sa‘d, for instance—as among the posts affected by ‘Ali’s purge³. The most important evidence that Mu‘āwiya did

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¹ Cf. infra p. 187.
² Bal. 498 r—99 v. (= Ya‘q. II, 214—17), 507 v—98 v. (Caetani 1 X, 239 ff., 485). al-Dīnārī even goes so far as to stamp the latter tradition as a fraud “by our b. Da‘b”.
³ Cf. sup. p. 170.—As against this the later tradition is in absolute unison: Immediately after the Caliph-murder Mu‘āwiya is to be replaced by Sahl b. Ḥunayf who is repelled, whereupon Mu‘āwiya bids defiance to ‘Ali. (Thus in
not revolt against the Caliph until after the battle of the Camel is found in an entirely independent source, some verses by the Umayyad al-Walid b. Uqbah in which he upbraids Mu'tawiyyah for his hesitation. "You have wasted your time in Damascus without accomplishing anything, just like a camel roaring with voluptuousness. With your letter to 'Ali you have behaved like the woman-tanner who will dress worm-eaten leather . . . . He that seeks vengeance, tarries not. Vengeance should be unmerciful. You ought to make his ('Utmân's) murder come alive and take sword without doubt and fear"1. These verses belong to the time immediately following the battle of the Camel when al-Walid fled to Raqqah; they establish a strong presumption that Mu'tawiyyah did not commit himself to vengeance until after that moment, and, consequently, that 'Ali is unlikely to have contemplated deposing him.

We have no doubt now arrived at a cardinal point of the conflict, which cannot have issued in action before December 656 at the earliest. This is quite in keeping with both 'Awânah and Shâlih b. Kaysân whereas Abû Mihna's assertion can henceforth be considered untenable. Also intrinsic criteria strengthen our confidence in 'Awânah. According to his account, the conditions which 'Ali imposes on Mu'tawiyyah must be described as very moderate indeed, and it is, moreover, especially noteworthy that the Caliph—against al-Âṣâr's wishes—chooses a Yamânite, and that 'Awânah himself adduces the reason that 'Âbari by virtue of his kinship with Mu'tawiyyah would have the best possible chances of reaching a favourable result. 'Âbari had taken

Sayf (Tab. I. 3087), Ya'q. II, 208, Din. 149 f. (Caetani IX, 8—15). It has already been shown that these sources tried to straighten out the inconsequences between 'Awânah and Abû Mihna by having 'Ali remove Mu'tawiyyah. With this in view they have conferred his office on Sahl b. Hunayf. On 'Ali's departure from Medina, Sahl was in fact made viceroy there, and when he in turn left to join in the attack on Syria, he installed Qutûm (or Tanûh) b. 'Abbâs as deputy (Wâq. in Tab. I. 3072; cf. b. Sa'd III. 1. 20 and 'Awânah (Bâl. 504 y); Caetani IX, 50, 289 f.). Sayf and Ya'qûbî have thus had to place b. 'Abbâs in Medina in order to make Sahl available for Syria! This interpretation falls entirely in line with Wellhausen's observation as to how Sayf—or his source—arbitrarily castsles with his characters for the benefit of the Prophet's family (Pro., 144 f.).

1 Bâl. 501 r; Tab. I. 3258 (Caetani IX, 255, 265).
a personal and very active part in Islam's conquests in Persia, and his own prestige as well as the weakness or placability in 'Ali indicated by the source's motivation, presents a strong case for the credibility of 'Awānah's account.

This interlude corresponds, as already mentioned, entirely with Šāliḥ's dating of the breach between Syria and Iraq. We learn here that Muʿāwiyah, to mark his standpoint—the accusation of 'Ali for joint responsibility in the murder and his demand for the election of a new Caliph—received oath of allegiance in the capacity of Amīr. This title is, however, borne by every governor, but in the present connection Šāliḥ must mean that Muʿāwiyah breaks away from the Caliph without himself acting as a candidate for the caliphate. This statement virtually defies verification because it stands nearly alone in the entire Islamic historical writing; it is touched on by b. 'Abdralbihi, who may have got it from the Medinese traditionists. Of somewhat greater significance is a short remark by Saʿid b. 'Abd al-Azīz to the effect that 'in Iraq 'Ali was addressed as 'amīr al-muʾminīn', and in Syria Muʿāwiyah as 'amīr'; upon 'Ali's death, however, Muʿāwiyah was addressed 'amīr al-muʾminīn''2. In this case, too, something more than the title ordinarily held by governors must be implied so that Šāliḥ's assertion is here quite accidentally borne out by a Kufic source. Finally, turning to independent Christian Syrian sources, we again find—albeit fainter—confirmation of Šāliḥ's trustworthiness. Most significant of all is Chronicon Maroniticum (seventh century), which distinguishes between three separate homages. The first one must be subject to territorial limitation seeing that Muʿāwiyah is here but 'sworn allegiance to as King by many Arabs in Jerusalem', in contradistinction to the subsequent, more general oaths of allegiance, of which the scene of one is likewise laid in Jerusalem, the other, and last one, in Hira after 'Ali's death. However, the Syrian

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1 Iqd. II. 202; Buhl, 77.
2 Tab. II. 4—5. (Caetani X. 373).
3 ZDAIG vol. XXIX, 95.—The date for the first two homage ceremonies is in each case given as 971 Sel. = the 18th year of Emperor Constantius II's reign, i.e. 600 and 609-61 respectively.—Re the chronology, cf. ibid. 84 f.—Pseudo-Dionysius of Tell-Mahré (9th century) tells that Muʿāwiyah aspired to the suzer-
monk concerned expresses himself with a regrettable lack of precision, and his chronology is obviously secondary. He has, on the other hand, been at fairly close quarters with the events, and his distinguishing between the three homages would be absurd, if they were not to his mind representative of distinctions, qualitative or quantitative.

We have thus every reason to believe in Šāliḫ b. Kaysān when he says that Muʿāwiya received homage as Amīr after the battle of the Camel, a statement that is substantiated by the fact that Muʿāwiya, before Ṣīffin at any rate, approached the old Saʿd b. Abī Waqqāṣ with a request to range himself on the side of ʿUṯmān’s cause” and a claim for a šūrā because Saʿd himself had been a member of “Qurayš’ šūrā” which elected ʿUṯmān. This appeal gives us, incidentally, a very interesting insight into Muʿāwiya’s policy. Saʿd b. Abī Waqqāṣ, one of Islam’s most prominent men, had been among those who most strongly dissociated themselves from the fitnah by joining the Muʿtazilism. Muʿāwiya can hardly have expected anything but the refusal that he duly received from Saʿd; however, this step of Muʿāwiya’s was, tactically speaking, a master stroke. He had remained neutral until the Caliph had defeated the self-appointed avengers in the battle of the Camel, and by no show of reason could his own right to vengeance be refuted. He was beyond any doubt his family’s most prominent member, and his right was implicitly upheld in the Quran. Muʿāwiya’s title to blood vengeance in behalf of his family did not in itself affect the fitnah, nor was it, as far as can be judged from the sources, ever called in question, even by the Muʿtazilites. It is likewise entirely consistent that the claim for blood vengeance should fall on ʿAlī seeing that the Caliph personally offered the munificence; the Syrians elected him and paid deference to him whereas the Iraqis wanted ʿAlī. (J. B. Chabot, ed.: Chronique de Denys de Tell-Mahre (Bibl. de l’Ecole des Hautes Etudes, no. 112, Paris 1895), 9 (verso pp. 8 f.).) Here, too, we note a distinction made between successive stages, but the argumentation is weakened by lack of perception and precision.—That Muʿāwiya did not arrogate to himself the title of Caliph also appears from the fact that no pilgrimage to Mecca was undertaken in his own name until 660. Cf. infra, p. 196.

1 Yaʿq. II, 217. (Caetani IX, 263); Iqd. II, 202; Buhl, 78.

2 Sure XVII:35.
derers shelter and thus created a situation, the scope of which he fully realized. Mu‘āwiya disallowed the validity of ‘Ali’s dignity because his share in the murder of the Caliph and his protection of the murderers made him unworthy of his high rank. Mu‘āwiya did not set up as Caliph himself, but merely claimed that a representation of the Muhammadan ummah should elect an unstained Caliph. On the whole, Mu‘āwiya’s attitude may be characterized by the fact that he draws his personal and political consequences from the same forces as those that explain the Mu‘tazilism’s detestation of the fitnah.

That Mu‘āwiya’s “official politics” appear extraordinarily expedient does in no way detract from the sincerity of his conduct. We know indeed from Kufic sources that at Šīffin the Syrians joined battle just as hesitatingly as their opponents for the very purpose of avoiding responsibility for the shedding of blood. His opposition to ‘Ali may very well have contained irrational elements as well as motives of power politics although we are unable at all times before 660 to find irrefutable evidence of his aims. In this connection his relations with ‘Amr are of considerable interest, a matter on which the Medinese sources are regrettably silent, and the Kufic ones, as already mentioned, obviously tendentious. ‘Amr’s participation in the battle at Šīffin appears to be the first ascertainable event, which, again, must presuppose a previous agreement with Mu‘āwiya concerning the Egyptian governorship, an agreement which we can, however, neither date nor place, but which nevertheless does imply that Mu‘āwiya must have had a clear conception of his ambitions before the battle at Šīffin.

That the conflict might have other than religious and personal aspects seems to be indicated by ‘Ali’s hope that Ġarir on the strength of his kinship with Mu‘āwiya would possibly be able to obtain an amicable solution. The premises must of course be the well-known distinction between the Yamanite and Kalbite tribes in Syria and Iraq. The contemporary poets and the later chroniclers reiterate almost without exception that Mu‘āwiya

1 Cf. Buhl, 59.
2 Cf. infra pp. 182f.
and the Syrians made the vengeance claims a pretext for advancing their own particular interests\(^1\). The cleavage between Iraq and Syria is—as described here—perhaps not quite unreasonable; it is known in Syrian sources, too, in al-Walid b. 'Uqbah and, most pregnantly, in the poet Ka'b b. Ġu'ayl who both, however, equally strongly maintain that by his conduct 'Ali incurred great responsibility\(^2\). However, this dividing line does not explain the whole state of conflict, for one reason because 'Ali and al-Aṣtar have not appeared as the exponents of any united Iraqi opinion against the Syrians, or even against Mu'āwiyyah. There are quite a few indications of mistrust of 'Ali in the eastern provinces, most frequently among the Iraqi Quran-readers. They all reveal religious misgivings as regards the Caliph's relations to the fitnah, despite al-Aṣtar's energetic defence of 'Ali\(^3\). The scruples evinced by Mu'tazilism have presumably been influenced by Mu'āwiyyah's appeals and have indirectly shaken 'Ali's prestige in Iraq.

The most striking feature in Mu'āwiyyah's conduct during the early phases of the conflict is, then, a peculiar mixture of caution and opportunism. He fails to intervene in al-ʿUtmāniyyah's self-appointed action of vengeance against 'Ali, and nobody can dispute his right to blood vengeance after the battle of the Camel. On the other hand, the Caliph has compromised himself religiously in consequence of his clash with the 'Utmānites and thus provoked desertion from his own ranks. The doubt as to whether 'Ali's attitude to the catastrophe in Medina made him worthy of continuing as the head of Islam was finally utilized by Mu'āwiyyah when he took up the fight after the battle of the Camel.

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\(^1\) Thus e.g. al-Naḡaši al-Ḥārṭiy's poem in Bal. 501 r (Caetani IX, 255); cf. Mubarrad 183–85 = Bal. 500 r (Ibid. IX, 256), in which al-Dimashqi characterizes the last poem as falsified; Din. 164 f., 173 f. (Ibid. IX, 242 f., 249 f.) and Mas. IV, 339, 344.—The cleavage between Syria and Iraq, as regards the motives, is reflected in several Syrian chronicles, presumably, however, in the light of the second civil war and its consequences; v. s., e.g., p. 176, n. 3.

\(^2\) al-Walid b. 'Uqbah (Bal. 500 r—v; Caetani IX, 254); Ka'b b. Ġu'ayl (Din., 170 f.; Kam. 189; Buhl, 60 f.).

\(^3\) Bal. 501 v—02 v. (without hadīd) = Din., 175. (Caetani IX, 284, 277, from Ġabāl Mīynaft?); Buhl, 58 ff.; cf. also Tab. I. 3322. (Caetani IX, 466) and supra p. 163.
It is conceivable that Mu`awiyah’s exposed position at the Byzantine frontier may have induced him to caution; it was apparently not until 658 that he obtained a truce with the Byzantines\(^1\). However, his politics are undoubtedly also guided by elements of a more irrational nature, such as his personal dilatoriness, his ḫilm, which, as we know, was characteristic of his conduct as Caliph\(^2\). European languages lack a single term covering this Arabic concept. That special quality, held in so very high esteem by the Bedouin, implies that its possessor in all circumstances knows how to make up his mind and is able to anticipate the outcome of his course of action; it further implies that in order to attain his object, he acts only upon careful consideration and accurate timing, always without resorting to any unnecessary show of power, and, wherever possible, utilizing such forces as the situation itself might have set free. ḫilm may thus be reflected in a kind of well-considered opportunism, i.e. exactly what we have seen Mu`awiyah display after `Uṯmān’s death by taking personal advantage of `Ali’s mistakes and loss of prestige\(^3\).

Mu`awiyah’s rebellion has presumably been much more dangerous to ḤAli than that of the `Uṯmānites because it was far better planned. Once more, however, the initiative in the military show-down had to issue from the Caliph. Of Mu`awiyah’s organisation of the battle we know nothing at all; the Syrian and Medinese sources are again absolutely silent. On the other hand, we have in Abū Mīḥnaf elaborate accounts of `Ali’s preparations and of the battle at Ṣifṭin. All this information of the Caliph’s administrative and military measures—of which we have, incidentally, analogous though more summary descriptions in `Awānāh—is exclusively Kufic. On the other hand, it is so copious

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\(^1\) Buhl, 61, n. 3.


\(^3\) This attitude, which we see revealed in the progress of events, is definitely formulated in D. `Abdrabbih who makes Mu`awiyah say, “I left him (`Ali) to his enemies. If they win, then he will be of far less consideration than they; and if he wins, his religious prestige will suffer”. (Iqd. II, 202., Buhl, 6, 54 f.). Later historians make use of ḫilm to bring out the contrast between Mu`awiyah and `Ali; cf. sup. p. 168.
that it can hardly be due entirely to late constructions; it no
doubt builds upon old traditions. The lack of established chron-
ological points seems likewise to denote its age. Only the quarrels
prior to the battle, the engagement itself, and the arbitration
document bear a date whereas all the other events appear as
elements without any chronological framework. Its credibility
is further borne out by some notes divulging weak points on the
Kufic side, for instance, the very unflattering account of 'Ali's
plan of revenge on 'Harir's house, an act that is warded off only
because the house is inhabited by some unoffending person.

Upon Mu'awiyah's refusal 'Ali summoned his provincial
governors with their forces and, presumably in the spring of
657, the army assembled at al-Nu'aylah outside Kufah where
the Caliph assigned the commands, dispatched his troops in the
direction of Raqqa in various detachments, and made a certain
Ma'qil b. Qays al-Riyahi march via Mosul, Nisibis against
Raqqa "with 3000 men in order to reassure the population." This
statement seems to me to illustrate the unrest in Iraq very
well. Ma'qil did encounter resistance from the 'Uthmânites in
Mosul, and later on the pro-'Uthmânite population in Raqqa
refused to ferry 'Ali across the Euphrates until al-Astâr's threats
compelled them to build a bridge.

Thus, the resistance which the Caliph met with from the re-
mainder of the 'Uthmânite groups during his advance, was, in
fact, but indirect manifestations of the fitnah. The latter is, how-

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1 On one point only are we able to verify the Kufic tradition by means of an
independent source, namely the Nestorian chronicler Eugipplus of Mabûd, who,
like 'Awânah and Abû Mi'ânas, relates that on his departure 'Ali made Abûdâlîân
b. 'Abbâs his deputy in Kufah.—The Arab sources do in a curious way confirm
this piece of information, for Abû Ma'âsar (Tab. I. 3273; Caetani IX, 206) says
that b. 'Abbâs headed the pilgrimage in behalf of the Caliph, and must surely
have passed Syrian territory in order to reach Mecca at the very time when the
two armies stood facing each other at Šîlin.

2 The many exact dates in the later sources form a sharp contrast to this,
but they all seem to be secondary.

3 Abû Mi'ânas. (Bal. 502 v—04 v); 'Awânah (Tab. I. 3259); Din., 177 (Caetani
IX, 286, 286, 280).

4 Din., l. c.

5 Abû Mi'ânas (Bal., l. c.; Tab. I. 3259—60; Caetani IX, 287 f., 267).
ever, voiced very pregnantly in Abū Miḥnaf’s description of the military operations when the armies made contact in Dhū-l-Hiǧǧah. On the vanguards’ meeting at Șifin, open fight was avoided by both the Syrians and the Iraqi, the latter, who were under al-Askar’s command, by express order from ‘Ali. Already then arose the question of the responsibility for the fighting, a question that cropped up again when al-Askar forced his passage to the watering place on the Euphrates, and thereafter time and again. The fraternization at the watering place has presumably played a decisive part in this discussion between the two camps about the responsibility. It is mentioned occasionally that members of the same tribe or family stood facing each other in either camp; who was right, and what would become of them if they were killed? Apart from sporadic Bedouin skirmishes, all regular fighting was apparently avoided in Muḥarram, the holy month during which ‘Ali made a new attempt to reach a reconciliation by appealing to Mu’āwiya to swear bay‘ah, but with no success. Mu’āwiya stood firm, he was entitled to revenge, and he demanded a šūrā.

Not until the 8th Ṣafar—the 19th July, 657—did the fight flare up again from the Iraqi side under al-Askar’s leadership; but it was suspended on the following day when the Syrians appealed to the decision of the Quran by fixing copies of it to their lances. A clear insight into what induced the Syrians to this step would be of fundamental importance. Judging from the context, there can have been no question of any imminent military catastrophe. In Abū Miḥnaf, ‘Amr appears as the author of this action which deliberately aimed at creating a cleavage in the Caliph’s army. In Șāliḥ b. Kaysān, the idea of appealing to the Quran arose

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1 Abū Miḥnaf (Tab. I. 3281); Ḥabīb b. Sa‘d’s verse in Din., 182. (Caetani IX, 436, 492).—In contrast with Mas. IV, 351, none of the earlier sources mention any regular suspension of the battle in Muḥarram.

2 Cf. Wellhausen, 80 f.—In Ella Bar Sināyā (Baethgen: Fragmenta syrischer und arabischer Historiker (Abh. j. d. Kunde d. Morgenl. VII:3, Lpz. 1884), 23 (verso 113)) the date of the battle is Monday, the 10th Ḥażirān, 908 Sel. This date, which did not, after all, fall on a Monday, but on a Saturday, corresponds to the 10th June 657 = 24 Dhū-l-Hiǧǧah, 37 a. H. Ella has probably mistaken the day the two armies met at Șifin for the day of the battle itself.

3 This version is repeated verbatim by az-Zuhri (Bal. 514 v—15 v = b. Sa‘d IV. 2. 3—4; Caetani IX, 488, 531) and Abū-l-Faraḡ (l. c., no doubt interpolated
more spontaneously, clearly induced by the dread of the fitnah, and several circumstances tend to show that he is right. It would undoubtedly be wrong to suppose that the Syrians should have been eager on fighting, and without any misgivings at all. We have already noted that fear of the fitnah was voiced also on this side before the battle; there is further proof of this mood in some verses by the Syrian poet Ḥābis b. Saʿd al-Ṭaʿī:

(1) There remains but seven or eight days until the end of Muḥarram.
(2) Are you (Muʿāwiya) not amazed that we and they are thus rushing to certain death?
(3) Maybe God’s book forbids us to rise against them, and does not the Quran’s words likewise forbid them?¹

In al-Ṭaʿī’s words it is the Quran’s—God’s—words that estrange the Syrians from the Iraqis, and that is literally the same conviction as was manifested so unmistakably by the Syrians when they fixed the Qurans to their lances. The same idea is expressed by the Iraqi poet al-Naqṣaṣ al-Ḥarīṭī who says:

(1) Since morning the Syrian soldiers have carried God’s book on their lances . . . and cried to ‘Ali:
(2) “Oh, Muhammad’s cousin, do you not fear to corrupt the two evident things (i.e. the Quran and the Prophet’s family?)”²

Nowhere is mention made of ‘Amr b. al-ʿAṣ, and the suspension of the battle was presumably brought about by latent feelings in the Syrian camp rather than by any threat of imminent defeat or by ‘Amr’s stratagem. Again, these feelings have been no less intense within ‘Ali’s party. In Abū Miḥnaṭ’s early authorities they appear occasionally during the battle itself, especially among the Quran-readers who dare not repudiate the possibility of ‘Ali’s being tainted by the murder of the Caliph, and who in their capacity of scholars consider themselves as being especially

¹ Din., 182. (Caetani IX, 492).
² Mas., IV, 378.
qualified for the task of mediation. Here, again, then, it is mentioned that the two parties are divided by the words of the Quran. No wonder, therefore, that it is the Quran-readers who most strongly advocate acceptance of the Syrian offer. This situation is soon crystallized in a proposal for arbitration, the details of which process we do not know. al-Aṣtar seems to have been against, first, the truce, and, secondly, both the idea of mediation and the election of an umpire, even though he, like ‘Ali, had to yield. The Caliph had desired to be represented on the arbitration by ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Abbās or al-Aṣtar, but his request was met with a downright refusal by the advocates for an agreement on the very remarkable grounds that al-Aṣtar was the contriver and guiding spirit of the entire war. Instead of ‘Ali’s candidates the opposition chose Abū Mūsā al-Āṣ’ari, and the Syrians, quite naturally, ‘Amr.

It is highly regrettable that Abū Mīḥnaf’s version of the events at Ṣaffān stands almost alone. Ṣāliḥ b. Kaysān passes very lightly over the battle and does not at all mention that ‘Ali is compelled by the oppositional elements in his own army to accept the arbitration against his wish. This omission can, however, hardly be interpreted as a decisive refutation of Abū Mīḥnaf, seeing that Ṣāliḥ entirely ignores the anxiety evinced by both parties for fear of bloodshed. The explanation seems to be that Ṣāliḥ wanted to emphasize, in contradistinction to the Kufic tradition, that ‘Ali consented of his own accord to the arbitration in order to throw the subsequent events into relief. In this respect Abū Mīḥnaf’s early authorities are in agreement so that they, in any case, represent an old and strong tradition; nor can the bitterness against the oppositional elements shake this account.

Such dividing lines as are suggested by the transmissions in Abū Mīḥnaf cannot possibly be accidental. The refusal to let al-Aṣtar represent the Caliph reveals a line of demarcation between the circles ranged behind ‘Ali’s Caliphate and the Mu-
‘azilism in Iraq; for it is precisely the point of view of the Neutralism that carries the day in ‘Ali’s camp at Šiffin thanks to the religious scruples; “the štuth broke out in the open”, says Abū Miḫnaf. And it is likewise these circles that forced Abū Mūsā on ‘Ali and had a decisive influence upon the arbitration agreement which the two parties—Syrians and Iraqis—drew up on the 13th Šafar (31st July, 657).

Neither as regards the arbitration document, known only through Abū Miḫnaf’s rendering, have we any extrinsic correctives. The cardinal point in the account—that in consequence of the Syrians’ refusal, backed by the Quran-readers who eagerly aimed at an agreement, ‘Ali has to renounce his title of Caliph—is based by Abū Miḫnaf on a reference to the Prophet’s example at al-Ḥudaybiyah, a story that may be authentic or, just as well, apocryphal. On the other hand, Mu‘awiya has at no time recognized ‘Ali’s Caliphate and could not do so as long as he had not been acquitted of the accusation of complicity in the shedding of ‘Uṯmān’s blood. Provided we dare have confidence in this account, then Mu‘awiya has pre-established for himself an equality of status with ‘Ali at the conference table. This would correspond quite logically with the object of the Mu‘azilites as regards the arbitration conference which must be defined as a desire on their part to conduct a trial on ‘Ali’s share in the catastrophe at Medina and with the Quran as criterion. ‘Ali did not himself, and quite consistently, have any immediate influence on the decision and could hardly have looked forward to much goodwill on the part of Abū Mūsā whom he and al-Aṣṭar had removed from the governorship in Kufah after the battle of the Camel. The arbitration award was thus, after all, expressive of the idea that Mu‘awiya’s programme should be attempted through negotiations between himself and the Mu‘azilites, and that the Quran was to be their guide.

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2 Seen in its contemporary setting this scheme of arbitration must presumably be interpreted as elaboration ad hoc of the traditional hakam-institution. (Cf. E. Tyau: Histoire de l’organisation judiciaire en pays d’Islam I (Paris 1938), 30 ff.; see also Wollhausen, 93).

3 Acta Orientalia, XXIII
III.

The agreement reached at ʿṢifīn in July 657 had appointed the arbitration meeting for Ramadān next, i.e. the month February 10th—March 8th, 658. The time is thus quite clearly defined. It is nevertheless peculiar how faltering our sources place the conference. Now Dūmat al-Ḡandal, now Aḏrūḥ—an oasis in South-Palestine—is mentioned as the place, and now 37, now 38 a. H. as the time of the meeting. Abū Mūḥāfaẓ gives Dūmat al-Ḡandal, and the originally fixed time, Ramadān 37, whereas both Wāqīḍi and b. Saʿd from Kufic sources have Aḏrūḥ in Ṣaʿbān 38, i.e. 2nd to 30th January, 659. Already Wellhausen and Buhl have proved conclusively that the latter dating must be the more correct one. We can now, moreover, add that ʿṢāliḥ b. Kaysān’s dating corresponds entirely with Wāqīḍi’s and b. Saʿd’s, for he says that the meeting place originally set down for Tadmur, was moved, first to Dūmat al-Ḡandal and from there to Aḏrūḥ in Ṣaʿbān, 38 a. H. We have thus evidence from two mutually independent reports that this dating must be the correct one. The uncertainty revealed in the sources thus finds an acceptable explanation in that the arbitration agreement, according to az-Zuhri, admits of postponement of the meeting, and that is indeed what seems to have happened. On this point, however, the Kufic sources are absolutely silent, whereas ʿṢāliḥ b. Kaysān—in perfect agreement, moreover, with Wellhausen’s and Buhl’s results—motivates, no doubt quite correctly, the postponement by difficulties in connection with the Ḥāriqīte rebellion in Iraq.

We do not propose here to go into details regarding the Ḥāriqīte rebellion. As we have seen, the arbitration document gave the representatives of two groups of the Muhammadan community access to define their attitude to the revolution in Medina, but

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1 Tab. I. 3354. (Caetani X, 18).
2 Tab. I. 3360, 3407. (Ibid. X, 18).
4 Wellhausen 88 ff.; Buhl, 72 ff.
5 Bal. 523 r. (Caetani X, 30); cf. also az-Zuhri (Tab. I. 3341; Caetani X, 26) and the poems in Yaʿqūb I, 174–75 (Ibid. X, 56) and al-Aḥṣaf’s poem (ed. Sulḥānī, 79; Caetani X, 60).
6 Bal. 523 r. (Caetani X, 30); cf. also della Vida, 476 ff.
this very agreement also blazed a trail for the third of the great politically-religious movements of these years: the Ḥārīǧites, who denied man's right to refer Allah's cause to arbitration; only by an open war to the bitter end could God's will be manifested. A reversal like this may seem to us anything but apparent by virtue of the preceding events, especially when we know that the movement sprang from the Neutrality within 'Ali's army at Ṣiffìn. It did, however, gather many adherents in Iraq and soon developed into open rebellion. In the summer of 658 'Ali had to take the field, and he defeated the rebels at Nahrawān in July. In the long run this victory, too, proved to be problematic. In the first place, the battle had not exterminated the Ḥārīǧites, secondly, and most significantly, the Caliph had once more incurred responsibility for the shedding of Islamic blood, whereas Mu‘āwiyyah had again, wisely, remained a spectator. When eventually the two umpires met a Aḍruḫ in January, 659, 'Ali's position was more unfavourable than ever before.—

Though there is no denying that the very idea of the conference must excite considerable interest, the shadows on this point fall still more close than on the preceding phases of the conflict. There is, after all, but scant consolation in the fact that our position to-day is not much inferior to that of the chroniclers who from the eighth century and onward fashioned the legend about these negotiations. Although the Aḍruḫ-meeting is indubitably one of the cross-roads in the whole of Islam's early history, the remembrance of it must have paled very early, presumably because it did not clear the way for an enduring solution of the conflict. It is once more in Ṣaliḥ b. Kaysān and Abū Miḥnāf's authorities, the two Kufic traditionists as-Ṣa‘ībī (d. 728) and Abū Ğanāb al-Kalbi (no data) that we find the oldest accounts which may be briefly rendered thus:

(1) Ṣaliḥ b. Kaysān. Mu‘āwiyyah appears punctually at Aḍruḫ

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1 For a detailed account of the Ḥārīǧite rebellion see: Buhl, 68 ff. and the literature quoted there.
2 It is also remarkable that Syrian and Byzantine historians as well as Continuatio Isidori Hispana, who otherwise keeps Islamic events in perspective, have nothing to tell us.
3 Bal. 521 v—23 r. (Caetani X, 28 ff.). az-Zuhri repeats Ṣaliḥ as to the essential features, though in a very pungent form (Tab. i. 3941—43. Caetani X, 26 ff.).
accompanied by a number of prominent Qurayšites, whereas ‘Ali fails to appear. Sa’d b. Abī Waqqāṣ claims to be entitled to the Caliphate in preference to anybody else because of his disassociation from the fitnah. In the course of negotiations Abū Mūsā moves tentatively that ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān b. al-Aswad az-Zuhri be elected Caliph whereupon ‘Amr, who is not in favour of Abū Mūsā’s candidate, reminds him that their task is to find a solution to the conflict in order to re-establish the unity of Islam. ‘Amr then proposes that one of them nominate the best qualified candidate. On Abū Mūsā’s refusal, ‘Amr takes the task upon himself, but then Abū Mūsā immediately regrets his decision. The meeting degenerates into a quarrel, during which the two umpires load each other with insulting Quran-verse. Šāliḥ, nevertheless, concludes his tale by having ‘Amr inform ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Umar—the Caliph’s son—that he is the nearest to the Caliphate. Abdallāh b. ‘Umar, however, declines the offer.

(2) as-Ša‘bī¹ has it that both Abū Mūsā and ‘Amr appear at “Dūmat al-Ġandal, in Adruḥ” with a train of 400 men, Abū Mūsā’s headed by Šurayḥ b. Hāni’ al-Ḥāriṭi and with ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Abbās as leader of the prayer. Also a number of prominent Qurayšites, among which ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Umar and ‘Abdallāh b. az-Zubayr, attend, whereas old Sa’d b. Abī Waqqāṣ refuses the invitation. During the negotiations ‘Amr pointed out Mu‘awiyah’s title to the office by referring, for one thing, to his claim of blood vengeance; for another, by asserting that he was the best qualified of all to rule; and, finally, on the ground of his being the Prophet’s brother-in-law and companion. ‘Amr tried to bribe Abū Mūsā who was not, however, to be entrapped, but instead proposed “to revive ‘Umar b. al-Ḥaṭṭāb’s name”.

(3) al-Kalbî². The meeting place is said to be Dūmat al-Ġandal. Abū Mūsā, whom ‘Amr persuades to be the first to express an opinion, rules out both Mu‘awiyah and ‘Amr’s sons as candidates for the Caliphate; instead he proposes ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Umar. However, the two arbitrators finally agree to Abū Mūsā’s suggestion to depose both ‘Ali and Mu‘awiyah and leave the election of a new Caliph to a šūrā. ‘Amr definitely consents and Abū

¹ Tab. I. 3354—56. (Coetani. X, 18 ff.).
² Tab. I. 3358—60. (Ibid. X, 22 ff.).
Mūsā, despite b. 'Abbās' warnings, takes it upon himself to be the first to make the decision public. He proclaims that 'Amr has agreed with him in deposing both 'Ali and Mu'āwiyah and to call a šūrā. 'Amr, on his part, does likewise rule out 'Ali but confirms Mu'āwiyah as 'Uṭmān's heir and the most suitable man. After a quarrel Abū Mūsā flees to Mecca, and 'Amr returns to Syria to swear allegiance to Mu'āwiyah as Caliph. The two parties henceforth curse each other during prayers.

The last two versions must, to judge from the context in Abū Mīḥnaf, be taken to supplement each other; their transmission is fragmentary, presumably for the very reason of his composition. A passage from al-Kalbi and subsequently also various anecdotes are made use of for the purpose of explaining as-Ša'bi's closing phrase which is lacking in precision; only after this long digression does Abū Mīḥnaf revert to his subject, leaving as-Ša'bi and turning to al-Kalbi. The parallel quotations of the two early authorities naturally raise the question of their original formulation and interrelation, as-Ša'bi is cut off at the decisive point of the negotiations, immediately before the matter is decided. We do not know the conclusion of his exposition, which has left no trace in the later Islamic chroniclers; as-Ša'bi does not himself give any hint from which some kind of inference might be drawn regarding the contents of his conclusion. Only the fact that Abū Mīḥnaf does not later see any cause for reverting to as-Ša'bi or to use him as a variant would suggest that he has been in harmony with al-Kalbi; this, however, is, and remains, conjecture.

By contrast, al-Kalbi's version in its existing form lacks an introduction to account for the external circumstances of the negotiations. Various features would indicate that al-Kalbi must at any rate have been acquainted with the prelude in a form related to or analogous with that of as-Ša'bi. Already the opening remark: "When 'Amr and Abū Mūsā met" calls for an introduction, and from the publication episode it must be inferred that neither Mu'āwiyah nor 'Ali can have been present in person whereas the negotiators were both accompanied by a numerous

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1 One further piece of evidence that the pure form of the earliest traditionists must have been lost during the early Abbassid period.
escort. Finally, ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAbbās and ʿUrayh b. Ḥāniʿ appear on the scene though we have not previously been told that they were to attend the meeting. There are other features tending to show some connection between the two traditionists. Both have ʿAmr bring up Muʿāwiya’s candidature, and both motivate his right on more or less the same grounds. It is no cause for surprise that in referring to Sure XVII:35 they both invest him with authority as ʿUṭmān’s lawful avenger, but it is remarkable that both have ʿAmr stress that Muʿāwiya’s personal qualifications make him the very man for the high dignity of Caliph. It may be presumed, therefore, that as-Ṣaʿbī and al-Kalbī represent a common, Kufic tradition, a presumption borne out by the fact that later historians, for instance b. Saʿd and al-Madāʾinī, with other authorities as their sources, present the same description without any breaking off1.

Even provided that this assumption is tenable, the tradition as represented by Abū Miṣnaʿī’s authorities does not in its present form constitute a homogeneous unity, but falls into three parts: an introduction accounting for the outer frameworks of the meeting; the negotiations during the meeting; and the incident pertaining to the publication. What strikes one most of all is the fact that in al-Kalbī the two latter elements are out of harmony. ʿAmr’s deceit cannot possibly be reconciled with the preceding negotiations. The last section is evidently marked by hostility to the Umayyads, and its authority is decisively shaken by a number of demonstrable errors and absurdities. For one thing, it is entirely out of the question that Abū Mūsā, or anybody else for that matter, should allow himself to be imposed on by ʿAmr through evident illoyality. This situation at any rate does not easily lend itself to adaptation into the events of the following period, and ʿAlī’s protest against the outcome of the meeting never hints at deceit on the part of ʿAmr, but denounces the two umpires without distinction2. Furthermore, Muʿāwiya received

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1 b. Saʿd III. 1. 21; Mad. (Iqd. II. 291—92) (Caetani X, 53 f., 57 f.). That al-Kalbī, as we now know him, fails to repeat all details from as-Ṣaʿbī may be due to Abū Miṣnaʿī’s drafting, and consequently cannot be taken to prove any mutual independence.

2 Buhl, 76 f.
no oath of allegiance as Caliph immediately after the Aḍruḥ meeting; that act did not in fact take place until July, 660. Dunning too is, finally, ‘Ali’s and Mu’āwiya’s mutual maledictions at the prayer, for the Umayyads have hardly practised this custom until during ‘Abd al-Malik’s caliphate (685—705), at the earliest. The final section is then by all appearances apocryphal and does not date back further than to the close of the seventh century. ‘Amr’s treachery is not verified by historical criticism.

The counterpart to this tradition is found in Šāliḥ b. Kaysān and az-Zuhrī, the latter’s exposition being the most extravagant and wholly devoted to the anecdote about ‘Amr’s cunning during the negotiations. This trickery is in itself hardly more convincing than the Kufic account of his treachery. Šāliḥ’s version represents undoubtedly the later Umayyad Caliphate’s official interpretation of the event, according to which the two arbitrators do not after all achieve anything; the anecdote would serve primarily to make Abū Mūsā look ridiculous in the bizarre humorous manner of the Arab. We may, presumably, advance a step further, for it is noteworthy that the quotations from the Qur’an which the two umpires, according to both versions, use to smear each other, are identical. In Šāliḥ’s rendering the tendency is conspicuously emphasized by having the actual decision of the meeting take place during the negotiations proper, and ‘Amr’s deceit after the agreement is thus eliminated; this tendency also shows up in that Mu’āwiya attends in person whereas ‘Ali fails to appear, thus giving ‘Amr—in az-Zuhrī—occasion to expostulate with the

1 Cf. infra p. 196.
2 Lammens, 183 ff.—As already mentioned, b. ‘Abbās’s far-sighted conduct is a stereotyped and late historiographical feature, which in a way goes to prove the dating of the final section as stated here.
3 Cf. also della Vida, 476 f.
4 az-Zuhrī has Mu’ākhrah b. Ŝu’bah prove at the outset by a random sample the hopelessness of the meeting. During the negotiations ‘Amr requests Abū Mūsā to propose a new Caliph and promises to accept his candidate—if he can; failing that, Abū Mūsā must bind himself to accept ‘Amr’s proposal. Abū Mūsā proposes b. ‘Umar, whom ‘Amr rejects and instead proposes Mu’āwiya. The negotiations then end in a quarrrel.
5 namely Sure VII:174 f. and LXII:5.
opposite party because the Caliph does not comply with his duty to attend. It is further to be noted that Sa‘d b. Abi Waqqas openly asserts his right to the caliphate even though we find no direct statement of his being present. Šāliḥ and as-Ša‘bi, on the other hand, agree on essential features as regards the setting of the meeting, especially in that they both, with insignificant divergences, furnish an identical list of the dignitaries present. It may thus be assumed that neither on this point can the two versions, the Medinese and the Kufic, be mutually independent; they carry on their controversy. Whereas Šāliḥ and az-Zuhri, no doubt actuated by Syrian impulses, stress that the decision was taken at the conference table in consequence of Abū Mūsā allowing himself to be trapped—that is, without showing illoyality—, Abū Miḥnaf’s authorities make a point of countering this rendering by emphasizing that the negative outcome of the meeting is due to ‘Amr’s deceit after the agreement had been concluded. In both cases the chroniclers resort to imaginative constructions which gradually degenerate into grotesque caricature under az-Zuhri’s pen, and which are anyhow quite irrelevant to us, except historiographically.

Here again the conflicting interpretations of the events seem to date further back, even where this cannot be definitely proved by the context itself. Šāliḥ’s view that the two arbitrators did not, after all, accomplish anything can be traced to the pro-Umayyad poets al-Aḥṭal and al-‘Awar aš-Šanī who flourished about 700; but their renderings are not elaborated to the same extent as those of the Medinese traditionists one generation later. Some pro-Alid poets, to the contrary, maintain that ‘Amr “did not act sincerely” at Aḍrüḥ, thus betraying knowledge of the account of his treachery after having agreed with Abū Mūsā. These few traits would suggest that the formation of the legend of the Aḍrüḥ meeting belongs to the period immediately following the second civil war.

It is clear that source material of this nature leaves us but scant hope of penetrating the events around the Aḍrüḥ meeting. Nor are the sections reviewing ‘Amr’s and Abū Mūsā’s conver-

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1 Caetani X, 57, 60.
2 Mas. IV, 400 f.
sation unaffected by the tendencies. In order to achieve the desired effect the chroniclers have to make Mu‘āwiya and ‘Ali appear side by side as caliphs or caliph candidates. It is, as mentioned before, unlikely that Mu‘āwiya should already at this time have proclaimed his candidature officially, although he may very well personally have had it in mind as his final objective. His purpose so far is solely to clear up ‘Ali’s connection with the murder of ‘Uṯmān, a point admitted by aṣ-Ṣa‘bī and al-Kalbi—indirectly also by Şāliḥ.

Apart from the fact that the two conflicting versions agree on the whole that the purpose of the meeting was to re-establish Islam’s unity, there remain only two concrete elements that have been passed over by the concrete criticism and by the polemics; they refer to Şāliḥ b. Kaysān’s statement that some prominent Qurayšīs attended the arbitration meeting, and to the Kufic transmission that the outcome of the negotiations was the setting up of a šūrā. We know already from the antecedents that the purpose of the conference was to try ‘Ali’s part in the Caliph murder and to restore concordia omnium. It is not surprising, therefore, that representatives of other groups of Islam and also b. ‘Umar and Sa‘d b. Abī Waqqās¹ were present. The former belonged by descent to the circle of the Prophet’s closest companions and was held in high esteem for his strict—but unworlthy—piety². His affiliation with Mu‘āzilism may indeed in Abī Mūsā’s eyes have been a further qualification. Of more weight, however, is the particular fact that Qurayš and Prophet companions were, numerically speaking, so very well represented on this occasion, for the inference hereof seems to be that the situation before 644 was uppermost in the minds of the participants when they used the expression “the restoration of Islam’s unity”. The very same idea is voiced by aṣ-Ṣa‘bī in that he makes Abī Mūsā bring up ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Umar’s candidature in order “to revive ‘Umar’s name”. The wish is to bring Islam back into the channels that had been blocked up during ‘Uṯmān’s turbulent caliphate.

The salient point is still, of course, the report on the issue of

¹ That he too—as-Ṣa‘bī’s denial notwithstanding—was in fact present, is evident from b. Sa‘d III. 1. 21. (Caetani X, 53 ff.).
the conference. In contrast to the Medinese transmission’s assertion that the meeting ended without result, we have al-Kalbi’s statement that the two arbitrators agreed that a šūrā was to be set up. That a result was achieved is borne out by ‘Ali’s subsequent protests against the award given by the two arbitrators. As we know from other authorities, already before Ṣiffīn Muʿāwiyyah had consistently aimed at having an election conclave nominate an unstained caliph. As pointed out by both Wellhausen and Buhl, it is of no less significance that Ḥārīgite quarters subsequently rebuked ‘Ali for not abiding by the arbitration award, and that they next demanded a šūrā. That so many representatives of Qurayš and Prophet’s followers were present would surely indicate that a šūrā was within the range of possibility. Thus all circumstances tend to show that al-Kalbi is right. Although we cannot—and probably never will be able to—obtain any absolute certainty on this point, we note that the decision to set up a šūrā is surely the most likely outcome of the Aḏruḥ meeting. If this conclusion is correct, the conference has eo ipso accepted Muʿāwiyyah’s assertion that ‘Ali’s relations with the fitnah disqualified him for the caliphate.

The result of this research is not generally incompatible with the opinion of Wellhausen or other authors even though a new method has been applied. However, Wellhausen’s and Lammens’ argumentation that ‘Amr should have enacted his opposite number in the negotiations to reject both Muʿāwiyyah’s and ‘Ali’s claim to suzerainty, and thus make the Caliph the real loser (seeing that Muʿāwiyyah’s aspirations were hypothetical only) is hardly tenable. It is entirely out of the question that Abū Mūsā, who had served as governor for a number of years in Kufah and was esteemed for his sound judgment, could be caught in such a crude trap. To Muʿāwiyyah, the mere agreement on an election

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1 This is repeated by al-Abītal, though hardly in authentic form. (Caetani X, 60).—Any assumption that the meeting had ended without result would imply a rejection of Muʿāwiyyah’s demand for vengeance, and in that case ‘Ali could hardly have had any cause for protest.

2 Wellhausen, 92; Buhl, 78.

conclave meant an immediate triumph, even if 'Ali—as had to be expected—would protest. This outcome is in perfect correspondence with the programme that he had personally set up after the battle of the Camel, and which the Mu'tazilites at Siffin had consented to re-examine in the light of the Quran's words. The Caliph would by any protest on his part irrevocably compromise himself before a court of arbitration that acted on Islam's behalf and had given its award on the basis of the Quran. The arbiters thus placed 'Ali in a dilemma which the immediate situation made irresolvable. He had simply been outmanoeuvred by the Syrian governor. Each one of those who had been implicated in the conflict carried into operation that particular ideology in which he had been brought up; but Mu'tawiyah seems, on the whole, to have displayed far greater ingenuity in exploiting it than 'Ali, who repeatedly found himself at variance with even the most elementary Islamic conceptions. The religious scruples proved to be Mu'tawiyah's most dynamic asset until the Caliph had been driven into a corner. However, Mu'tawiyah's conduct is not due to pretence, for, as we have seen, the purely political aspects of the strife were in his case—more, perhaps, than in any other participant's—linked up with religious and psychological elements.

In its essence the conflict did, after all, turn on the question of the Umayyads' or the Prophet family's political ascendancy in Islam, i.e. the resolution of those elements of the conflict, for which the Prophet in the last years of his life had himself laid the scene. In the long run the Prophet's companions lacked strength to assert themselves—moreover, they died out gradually. And the Prophet's descendants possessed neither the ability nor the sufficient measure of inherent prestige to carry on Muhammad's theocratic community. It was the Meccan aristocracy—which Muhammad had defeated, but not crushed—that reaped the fruits, and could do so because they were the mainstay of an old Arab tradition, and also by virtue of that political and economic groundwork which they themselves had laid in Syria, undoubtedly, all subsequent denunciations notwithstanding—for the benefit of Islam in its earliest development.

That Mu'tawiyah refrained from taking the offensive against
Kufah is but natural, and does not affect the outcome of the conference. 'Ali still retained the Caliphate, but difficulties were rising about him, especially because of the Ḥārīgītic unrest in Iraq. His protests against the Aḍrulḥ-meeting's decision kept the conflict open, though now with its focus shifted to the possession of Egypt, which Muʿāwiyah for strategic as well as economic reasons could not leave to the Caliph. He seems to have pursued a systematic policy of infiltration in Egypt where the situation from a Syrian point of view became imminently dangerous by 'Ali's appointing al-Aṣṭar vicegerent. Muʿāwiyah, however, succeeded in having al-Aṣṭar assassinated whereupon 'Amr effected the conquest of Egypt. Thus 'Ali had lost his staunchest support—"one of 'Ali's two right hands", as Abū Mīḥnaf makes Muʿāwiyah comment on the murder—and with the fall of Egypt, the entire foundation of his power crumbled away. Finally, in January, 661, he became the victim of a Ḥārīgīte attempt on his life. But then Muʿāwiyah had already in July of the preceding year received the oath of allegiance as Caliph in Jerusalem, and after the murder of 'Ali he was soon generally recognized as Caliph in the eastern provinces as well.

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1 For the following, see Buhl, 79—85.
2 Tab. I. 3393 f. (Caedmon IX, 503 f.).
3 Chronicon Maroniticum, l. c., p. 95; Sallīh b. Kaysān (Bal., 570 r; Caedmon X, 354). The Syrian monk gives the date of the event as July, 660 and Sallīh as 5. Rabi' I, 40 a. H. (= 19 July, 660), a detail speaking in favour of Sallīh's reliability.—Already before that date, viz. in n. H. 39 (= the spring of 660) Muʿāwiyah had organized his own pilgrimage, in opposition to 'Ali's. (Waq. (Tab. I. 3448), Bal., 572 r—v, without isnād), and Abū Mīḥnaf (Ibid., 572 v—73 v; Caedmon X, 296 ff.).